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Introduction
From 1650 to World War II, Great Britain dominated the seas. Its command of the deep
waters allowed them to overpower its opponents and create an empire that lasted into the
twentieth century. Without their utilization of logistical support, though, they would not have
gained this overriding presence upon the oceans. The Royal Navy and its supporting vessels
relied on each other: without the one, the other could not survive. Scholars often overlook the
importance of logistics with the Royal Navy in favor of its officers, the battles, and the
operations that led to their dominance. It is true that without these factors, the Royal Navy could
not have gained command of the seas. Logistics, however, played a major role in this ascension
to power. While Britain had dominated the seas since the mid-seventeenth century, the Seven
Years War proved an important turning point for the Royal Navy. Before the conflict of 1756 to
1763, Britain dominated the oceans, yet other nations contested that supremacy. With the
conclusion of this world war France and Spain did not have the capability to regain territories
lost to the British, nor did they have the fleets to reestablish maritime trade. Not until the
Revolutionary War did they have the capacity to fight against the British once again and then
only for a short while.
Beginning on the North American continent, the Seven Years War established British
supremacy in the New World. While scholars entitled the war the “Seven Years War” to describe
it in the global sense, they titled the war in North American as the “French and Indian War.”1
Here the logistical support of the Royal Navy undeniably aided the war effort. Without this
logistical support, the British would have lost the war. The campaign to take Canada was the
most evident example. While there, the British faced obstacles such as Native American
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ambushes, uncertain supply lines, and inclement weather. During the war’s early stages, as the
British struggled with mobilizing resources, France pushed back their forces and nearly
overcame them. Once the British gained proper logistical support, though, they proved more than
adequate in taking Canada from the French. With their superior navy backed by a resourceful
economy, the British overwhelmed the French, regaining lost forts and seizing the fortresses of
Louisburg and Quebec, essentially ending the war in North America. Without the efforts of the
Royal Navy, this would not have been possible. In 1759, the fleet gained control of the inland
waters and utilized the rivers and lakes that make up the region as thoroughfares for providing
supplies and fresh troops. At the same time, the British gained needed experience in frontier
campaigning and put these lessons to use against the French and Indian forces arrayed against
them.
This control of the inland waters provided the British with valuable ports and access
points to begin offensives. One of the most important contributors to the effort to take the inland
waters was Captain Joshua Loring. As an agent for transports and a captain in the Royal Navy,
Loring utilized the resources at hand to construct vessels to assist with Major General Jeffrey
Amherst’s push to take Quebec. While unable to deploy these vessels in the thrust before the
winter of 1759, Loring’s contributions to the war effort allowed the Royal Navy to utilize various
vessels to transport troops to the North American continent.2 In addition, Amherst’s ability to
understand the necessities of logistics and to utilize the resources at his disposal ensured that the
British succeeded in the French and Indian War
Necessity calls for a brief discussion of the events leading to the French and Indian War.
The War of the Austrian Succession ended between the French, British, and their respective
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allies in 1748. The nature of the treaty did not settle a number of points of contention globally
and thus disagreements abounded. Hostilities continued in India even after the treaty restored
territory to their previous owners. After the war ended in 1748, the combatants established a joint
Boundary Commission to resolve any border disputes remaining between the countries. Owing
to intense competition between Britain and France, the commission achieved nothing. France
claimed all territory west and north of the British colonies. Owing to tradition, France believed it
owned all areas near rivers and tributaries that a Frenchmen had sailed on.3 Naturally, this
included the Ohio River Valley and the Mississippi River Valley.
While various other incidents occurred between the two governments around the globe,
the impetus for the outbreak of the French and Indian War came from contested claims in the
Ohio River Valley. French traders used the rivers and lakes to barter with Native Americans
nations in order to gain wealth. While the French grew rich from the fur trade, the Indians gained
access to European goods, such as guns and musket balls. This mutual trading built alliances
between the French and the Indians. After King George’s War,4 however, the fall of Louisbourg
and the closing of the St. Lawrence River cut off this ready supply of French products to the
Indians. French traders in Ohio, specifically, had difficulty obtaining goods and increased the
value of the products they traded.5
Many historians traditionally argue that the war began with English or Virginian
encroachment westward and the French reaction of bolstering their military presence in the
region. They claim that the chartering of Ohio Company in 1749 caused the French distress. 6
3

Daniel Baugh, The Global Seven Years War: Britain and France in a Great Power Contest (United Kingdom:
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Thus, they place the fault of the war on the English. Daniel Baugh argues in The Global Seven
Years War, however, that when the French acted in 1752, the English seemed prepared to move
into the Ohio River Valley, but they had yet to make this a reality. He also argues that with the
threat of English expansion, many of the French-allied Indian forces believed that the English
would encroach upon their territory. The French did not possess the resources or the colonists to
settle the region, so the representative for the French found it relatively simple to assure the Ohio
Indians that the French would never colonize upon their lands.7
Whereas the British found the utilization of rivers integral to the logistical support of
their troops in the North American theater, the French coveted the upper Ohio region because the
region provided “the easiest point of access to the whole river from Canada; no Frenchman knew
of a better on, and in fact there was none better.”8 Baugh states that the region provided a
convenient shield against British traders infringing upon the French fur trade with the Indians of
that region. Finally, he argues that moving into that region provided the French with the ability to
protect the claim made by French explorer Lieutenant Pierre-Joseph de Céloron de Blainville.9
France’s willingness to disregard British response to their invasion of the region led Virginia’s
Lieutenant Governor Robert Dinwiddie (1751-1758) to send a letter to the Board of Trade
requesting assistance.10 George Montagu-Dunk, the president of the board (also known as Lord
Halifax), read the letter and sent extracts to the Duke of Newcastle, Thomas Pelham-Holles, that
highlighted Dinwiddie’s testimony of the building of French forts in the Ohio region.11
Newcastle called a gathering of the cabinet, and they sent a letter to the governors of the colonies
7
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in North America to raise awareness of the situation, as well as request them to do everything in
their power to halt the aggressive actions of the French. The cabinet ordered the colonials to
remain on guard against French incursion, as well as to verify reports of the French building forts
in the Ohio River region.12
Dinwiddie received special instructions to construct a fort on the Ohio River as soon as
possible. If anyone sought to obstruct the project, then he should utilize the militia.13 In order to
gain intelligence on the French fort, Dinwiddie sent Major George Washington of the Virginia
militia to journey northward. Dinwiddie ordered him to scout the enemy fortifications, as well as
order them back to French territory if possible. After trudging to the north “across swollen
streams and half-frozen swamps,” they arrived at Fort Le Boeuf, where he met the commanding
officer of the French forces in the area: Sieur Legardeur de Saint-Pierre.14
While Saint-Pierre explained that his superiors ordered him to occupy the area,
Washington gained valuable information about the fortifications that the French established in
the area. He noted the dimensions and defenses of the palisades and barracks that the French
built and ordered some of his men to count the number of canoes that the French had prepared.
He found that they had constructed approximately 220 of them and seemed prepared to begin
building more. With the letter that the commanding officer of the French sent back with him,
Washington was convinced that the French meant to maintain their claim of the Ohio Valley.15
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Washington left the fort on 16 December and arrived in Williamsburg a month later. The
reply of the French convinced Governor Dinwiddie that Virginia faced a crisis on her western
borders. While Dinwiddie was continuously at odds with the House of Burgesses and remained
so, the upper house proved more willing to respond to his request for the raising of arms.16
Dinwiddie ordered the recruitment of two hundred men to march under the newly promoted
Lieutenant Colonel Washington “to the Forks of the Ohio and defend Virginia’s interests against
further French encroachments.”17
This marching of troops expedited the outbreak of the French and Indian War. While
Washington had gained experienced leading his command to the French fort previous excursion,
he had no experience in the art of warfare. His only knowledge of it came from reading books
and questioning his older half-brother Lawrence about his experience as a British army officer. A
lack of recruits for the expedition also hindered the start of his campaign. Few colonists chose to
enlist owing to the Virginia legislature providing only enough expenditure to pay the soldiers
half of what a normal laborer made in a day. Not only did Washington struggle with a lack of
experience and soldiers, the disinterest of Native Americans to assist him in his previous
16

While Dinwiddie convinced the upper house to approve his measures to take arms against the French, he did not
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decided to approve ten thousand pounds in funds for the expedition, they attached stipulations to the expenditures,
so that they remained aware of what each pound paid for. They feared that Dinwiddie would utilize the war to
increase the power of the Virginian government and enrich him and his associates connected to the Ohio Company,
Anderson, Crucible of War, 46.
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money, but with the land they would secure if the venture succeeded. Thus, few chose to join the militia’s
expedition. Finally, Dinwiddie casually told Commissary John Carlyle what to order for the expedition. His orders,
however, did not include an understanding of the difficulty with supplying an army in the wilderness. After the
failure, he laid the blame on everyone, except himself. Carlyle received the worst of it. He in turned laid the blame
on unreliable frontiersmen, as well as a lack of capital to purchase supplies (49).
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expedition into the Ohio River region signified the weakening of British-Indian alliances.
Without their help, Washington could not hope to drive the French from the area.18
Washington proceeded to Will’s Creek in Maryland in mid-April commanding a paltry
one hundred fifty-nine men. In order to supplement his lack of experience, Washington expected
Colonel Joshua Frye to meet him there, with British regulars from South Carolina joining them
shortly afterward. While at Will’s Creek, the lieutenant colonel received news that hundreds of
French soldiers were preparing to pour into the Ohio River Valley, to claim it for the crown of
France. Taking stock of his poorly equipped men, Washington chose to march for the Ohio River
Valley on 30 April. This action instigated the beginning of the French and Indian War and
ultimately the Seven Years War. Washington’s desire to follow Dinwiddie’s orders to the letter
forced him to attack a French encampment. Joining his men in the attack, were Indian warriors
led by Tanaghrisson, the Half-King. Washington and his allies successfully ambushed the French
camp and quickly subdued their enemies.19
Unfortunately, owing to either unclear orders or Washington’s intentional silence, the
Native American warriors slaughtered several of the French soldiers including the commanding
officer of the expedition. Fred Anderson argues that the thirty-five year old French ensign,
Joseph Coulon de Villiers de Jumonville tried to explain to Washington that he was a diplomatic
envoy. His commandant at Fort Dusquene had sent him with a letter to order Washington to
cease marching his troops across French lands. While in the process of translating the letter

18
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however, Tanaghrisson stepped in and smashed his tomahawk down upon Jumonville’s skull,
killing him.20
This single act by Tanaghrisson did more to instigate war between Britain and France
than any other action taken by either side. After this occurrence, Washington withdrew from the
area and sent out troops to head off a French advance, only to receive intelligence after they had
left that the French had marched in the opposite direction. Realizing the direness of the situation,
he returned to the fort constructed earlier in the campaign, Fort Necessity. Upon his arrival, he
set up his troops to prepare for a French siege. Realizing the weaknesses of the fort and the
futility of the resisting parties, Tanaghrisson withdrew from the campaign, hoping that the
situation that he instigated would return him to power over the Indian tribes in the Ohio River
Valley.21
After his withdrawal, Washington found himself besieged by French forces under the
command of Jumonville’s brother, Captain Louis Coulon de Villiers on the morning of 3 July.
Coulon attacked the fort with six hundred French regulars and Canadian militiamen, as well as
100 French-allied Indians. Their attack continued throughout the day and by nightfall,
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Washington contemplated the possibility of defeat. At this moment, though, the French declared
a ceasefire and sent envoys to convey terms of peace.22
Owing to his inability to understand French and his translator’s mistranslation of the
surrender document, Washington signed a document declaring that he had ordered the
assassination of Jumonville. Nor did he realize that elsewhere the document stated that
Jumonville had been an envoy, carrying a summons to order the British forces of the French
majesty’s land. Washington’s actions ultimately gave the French king the justification needed to
declare war against Britain once again. 23
Even at this point, the French did not declare war on the British. They seemed inclined to
wait until hostilities increased. Washington’s inexpereince at command began the French and
Indian War, but other events influenced its outbreak. British command sent General Edward
Braddock to take command of the colonial forces and to force the colonies into some semblance
of cooperation. The colonies had split in their desires and some did not intend to strike against
the French. This led to Newcastle and Cumberland to develop a strategy to pull together the
colonies. Owing to Cumberland’s mindset, however, the plan soon became one consisting
entirely of his manipulations, leading to his selection of General Braddock as the leader of the
expedition to oust the French from North America. Upon his arrival in the colonies on February
19, 1755 he did not wait for the 44th and 48th Foot Regiments to arrive, but instead began
conferring with Governor Dinwiddie concerning the specifics of his campaign in the north. Yet,
Braddock’s actions endeared him little to the British colonists. In quick succession, he sent
22

Ibid., 49-50. The attack suddenly ceased owing to the lack of ammunition that the French forces carried with
them; the long day had used up much of his ammunition. He also realized that he did not have much legal authority
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23
Ibid., 52. Owing to the number of troops that traveled with Jumonville, there may have also been a mission of
scouting out the British forces, somewhat nullifying the diplomatic envoy status that Jumonville had. Washington’s
translator’s inability to correctly read the document, may owe to the rain that continued to fall throughout the day
and night, as well as the lack of light.
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letters ordering each of the colonies to join in the war effort, commanding the Pennsylvanians to
provide the support he required, while pressuring New York, Albany, Boston, and Philadelphia
to cease trading with the French.24
When the governors and Braddock finally met in the middle of April 1755 in Alexandria,
Virginia, his brash and forceful personality put him at odds with the colonial governors. He
treated them “as if they were his battalion commanders instead of men who would have to cajole
stubborn, suspicious, locally minded assemblies into supporting the common cause.”25 Instead,
he read out his commission and only provided enough information about his objectives for his
coming campaign to alert the governors that the colonies would finance it. Concerning the
military operations, Braddock revealed that British high command was sending Admiral Edward
Boscawen and his fleet to the Gulf of St. Lawrence. In theory, this fleet would prevent the
French forces in North America from receiving reinforcements.26 The 44th and 48th Foot
Regiments would depart soon upon “an expedition against Fort Duquesne. The 50th and 51st
Regiments, deactivated tat the end of King George’s War and lately reconstituted, were to march
under the command of William Shirley from Albany to seize the French fort of Niagara, at the
head of Lake Ontario.”27
While Braddock’s plans seemed to have a logical basis in European warfare, colonial
warfare had a different sort of taste to it. The governors knew this and Braddock only learned
this when he lost his life on the Monongahela River. It took until 10 June 1755 for Braddock to
march his 2,000-strong force from Fort Cumberland, Maryland. While well supplied and

24
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provisioned, his army “was nonetheless a lumbering ox.”28 The wagons were heavy, the artillery
pieces were designed for coastal bombardment instead of frontier warfare, and a large number of
camp followers “blunted [rather] than sharpened its strategic focus.”29 It took the army seven
days to travel twenty-two miles on the same route that Washington had taken in 1753 and 1754.
The density of the forest also hindered the progress of the train, as they cut down trees in order to
allow its passage. In an endeavor to enhance the speed of his army, he divided it into two parts:
with 1,300 men, the majority of the cannon, and a quarter of the wagon train, he would continue
forward.30 The rest would come along as fast as they could. This attempt at alacrity though, only
weakened him. Yet in his arrogance, he did not know the size of the French force.31
Even with the reduced force, he still needed to clear trees in the path of his men. This
slowed him his approach upon Fort Duquesne. Forced to deal with rolling hills and dense forests,
and stopping to cross streams, the troops arrived eight miles southeast of the fort twenty-two
days later. Braddock’s arrogance showed ever more, when his subordinate officers continued to
request that he call up the remainder of his forces. He refused.32
They continued into the forest and on 9 July 1755 they met with the enemy. Around one
in the afternoon, scouts spotted the French and Indian force in the woods in front of them. As the
opposing forces arrayed themselves for battle, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Gage’s men opened
fire with three volleys. Even though they were still two hundred yards apart, one of the balls
28
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the wilderness was a commendable feat, traveling through one hundred miles of mountain ranges and soggy
meadows in just over a month.
32
Ibid., 50.

13

killed the commanding officer of the advancing French force, Captain Daniel Liénard de
Beaujeu. While his loss threw the militiamen and regulars into confusion, the Indians under his
command continued forward, slipping into the forest on the flanks of the British detachment.
Later accounts reveal that the battle occurred at an Indian hunting ground, where in previous
years the local tribes had burned the undergrowth down to allow quicker movement and better
vegetation for fodder. The conditions that huntsmen utilized to kill prey, now allowed the Native
American marksmen to bring down the British soldiers.33
The ferocity of the Indians forced the regulars to retreat. Unfortunately, at the first sound
of shots, Braddock had ridden forward with his men. He attempted to restore some order, but he
failed. Within the span of a few minutes, the formation had fallen into chaos. Forced to retreat,
Braddock fell prey to the shots of the enemy. While he survived the day, his wounds overtook
him and he died before 14 July, buried without ceremony in the middle of the road.34
The enemy was well fed and rested. Not only did they have the advantage of the home
ground, but also the British had no idea about fighting in the forest. When attacked by such a foe,
they fell back on their training, relying on their columns for defense. Yet, in the end this proved
their undoing. The French and Indians fired straight down the columns, which made it easier for
them to kill the “redcoats.” The British suffered from exhaustion, hunger, thirst, and heat. Fear
had worn on their nerves, and suddenly they found themselves fighting a battle in the middle of a
forest. They had never encountered such warfare in Europe.35
While Braddock did make mistakes, the larger reason for this failure came from the
unpreparedness of the British forces for wilderness campaigning in the New World. This battle
only served as an example of the defeats Britain would suffer. Not until she understood the
33
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importance of preparedness and logistics in frontier warfare could she hope to overcome the
French in this battle for the New World. Unfortunately, the British continued to suffer these
failures in the early years of the war. It was not until 1758, that the fortune of war turned in their
favor, when Major General Jeffery Amherst took command of the British forces in North
America.
The goal of this thesis is to examine the importance of logistics on the inland waters of
Canada during the French and Indian War. It is thus necessary to investigate a variety of
logistical factors. A historian cannot overlook the role of geography and weather in the North
American theater of the Seven Years War. These two elements caused havoc upon both sides as
the testimony of John Knox and Louis Antoine de Bougainville share. Canada’s geography
posed a problem for maneuvering badly needed supplies and provisions to troops fighting against
the French and the Indians. Consistently used roads were non-existent in the northern wilderness
and the unpredictability of raiding parties from New France made the transportation of
necessities to British soldiers dangerous. Even the very foliage worked against the British in their
early attacks upon Canada. The densely grown trees and undergrowth prevented the full-scale
column marching that typified European warfare and led to the full-scale slaughter of British
regulars and colonial militias. The officers of His Majesty’s army failed to understand the
intricacies of frontier warfare and the necessity of fighting “Indian-style” in the cold forests of
the north. Their reliance on traditional warfare prevented them from responding efficiently to the
hit and run tactics of the enemy.
The weather also proved a formidable foe in the conquest of New France. Sudden
snowstorms blinded troops and trapped colonists, leaving them to die from suffocation or starvation before help could intervene. Soldiers succumbed to freezing temperatures owing to a
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lack of proper clothing and nutrition. Immense snows prevented the transportation of supplies,
while mudslides from the melting of snow destroyed established routes into the interior of
Canada. In order to survive and conquer New France, the British learned to adapt and utilized the
lakes and waterways of the north. By relying on them, the British forged a path to victory. Still,
the dangers of the waters often took vessels from the war effort and the vast distance across the
ocean slowed the transportation of needed materials, but the eventual wresting of control of the
passages from the French allowed the British to obtain the advantage. Without the rivers and
lakes of the Canadian frontier, their success in the north would have never occurred. The
utilization of amphibious operations was a key factor in the defeat of the French.
Chapter Two covers the various logistical issues that occurred in the conquest of Canada
and ultimately the winning of the Seven Years War. This ranged from the programs of the
Victualing Board to the colonial ranging companies that understood the intricacies of fighting
frontier warfare. The chapter attempts to tie together a variety of issues and serves as a general
overview of the vast components of successful logistical operations in the French and Indian
War.
The examination of the personas involved in the actual undertaking of logistical
operations in North America during the French and Indian War occurs in Chapter Three. Without
the desperate efforts of the agents for transports, the British victory would not have happened.
Their work to charter vessels in preparation for transporting supplies, provisions, and
reinforcements to North America and around the world, led to the successful conclusion of the
world war. By utilizing the services of the various merchant vessels and directing them to ports
in desperate need of supplies, agents for transports allowed the British troops and their allies to
keep fighting what seemed at times a losing war. Their successful contracting of vessels also
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provided the Royal Navy with needed ships for the undertaking of amphibious operations
whether in Europe or in North America.
Not content to utilize only British vessels, they acquired the services of various
merchants and captains in the American colonies. The shorter distance between the colonies and
Canada allowed the British to resupply their troops faster. The agents for transports also utilized
shipping from the New England colonies, where shipbuilding and maritime affairs remained an
important part of life even into the eighteenth century. The vessels contracted from
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and even New York took troops to the walls of Louisbourg, and
after its fall, to the gates of Quebec. The absence of American vessels would have severely
inhibited British operations in North America.
Other key military and civilian personnel during the Seven Years War heavily involved
themselves with logistics. Major General Jeffery Amherst, the commander-in-chief of British
operations in North America, understood logistics deeply, unlike the officers that served in his
post before him. While in the earlier years of the war, several officers had attempted to dislodge
the French from their hold in North America, none succeeded. This owed in large part to their
lack of understanding of logistics.
Amherst, on the other hand, had a greater understanding of logistics. Utilizing the
resources at hand, he obtained the necessary supplies and provisions needed to ensure that his
forces succeeded in their conquest of North America. Instead of charging straight into the midst
of battle, he waited until he had the necessary logistics to carry out his operations. He also
worked with the navy to ensure that amphibious operations could occur. The proper coordination
of both the army and the navy gave the British the advantage they needed to defeat the French in
the Seven Years War. The letters between him and his officers offer an interesting perspective as
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he inquired about the provisions and supplies needed for the successful execution of his invasion
of Canada. This concern for logistics eventually led him to become master of Canada.
Joshua Loring was another key figure concerning logistics in the world war. Overlooked
by many historians, his contribution nonetheless was important to the success of Amherst’s
operations upon the lakes. This included his time as an agent for transports and as a captain
aboard Squirrel on the inland waters. His involvement with the procurement of vessels and other
necessary equipment for the invasion of Canada was integral to the success of the British
mission. The captain’s victory over various French elements on the lakes also cleared the path
for the operation to proceed.
Since the British dominated the world’s oceans from the time of the Anglo-Dutch Wars
to the modern era, there exists a sense that their victory in the Seven Years War was a foregone
conclusion. The evidence shows otherwise. Their opponents overtook them in the early stages of
the war and the French dominated the northern frontiers of North America until 1758, when
Amherst took command and the flow of the war turned to England’s favor. After this point, it
decisively defeated the French on every front, essentially ending the war in North America by
1760. This owed to their realization that without logistics they could never defeat the French in
Canada. In breaking down the factors of geography, logistics as a whole, and the agency of man
in logistics, a sense of the difficulty in waging war on such a geographically diverse continent as
North America will appear. Owing to this, the eventual outcome of the Seven Years War that
rendered the power of France and her allies inert for a time and placed Britain at the forefront of
the world will seem all the more remarkable. Without a proper understanding of the importance
of logistics and the factors that contribute to it, there can be no true understanding of the Seven
Years War.
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CHAPTER I: Powdered Snow and Frozen Rivers
Since the beginning of warfare, logistics has played a critical role in military operations.
In ancient times, logistics concerned the supply of arrows, provisions, water, or even horses.
From the fifteenth century, gunpowder, ammunition, and firearms have complicated the issue.
Access to these necessities helped change the course of human history. Without access to proper
logistical support, armies, if not entire countries, have fallen to their enemy. Even if a power
properly supplies its military there still exists the potential obstacle of geography.
Weather and geography have controlled the flow of battle for centuries. Whether in the
jungles of India or in the forests of Canada, inadequate preparation for the battleground’s
geography ultimately leads to the defeat of a military force. Geography and climate destroyed the
Spanish Armada and prevented Napoleon Bonaparte and Adolf Hitler from conquering Russia.
In the French and Indian War, the forests and ice of Canada nearly ensured the defeat of the
British military in North America. Professor John Shy states in his work Toward Lexington that
“geography created problems of communications and supply so great that the principal task of
generalship was in simply moving a force of moderate sixe into contact with the enemy.”1
Unlike Europe, dense forests and lakes covered Canada and the Ohio backcountry in the
eighteenth century. In previous European wars, the British troops had fought on relatively
developed ground. In North America, however, they had to deal with frontier campaigning, a
more difficult form of warfare. Not only did they struggle with fighting in the closely grown
vegetation, they also had to deal with raids by the Native Americans, Canadians, and even the
French. The forests prevented them from fighting in the traditional fashion, long lines of soldiers
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aiming their muskets at the enemy. Owing to the proximity of the trees and the raiding tactics of
their enemies, the British soldiers found themselves at a severe disadvantage.
Just as the density of the forest prevented the British from carrying out normal military
operations, the vegetation hampered the desperately needed logistical support. The movement of
supplies from one place to another either necessitated utilizing non-existent roads or find another
viable route to transport such things as food, clothing, gunpowder, or ammunition. Building
roads from scratch consumed time and left the British regulars open to raids by the French and
their Indian allies. The dense forests also made the felling of timber and building of roads
difficult. Even when Washington built the aptly named Fort Necessity, the geography of the land
worked against him, causing him great difficulties in the defending of the Ohio River territory
from French incursion. The fort consisted “of a seven-foot-high circular stockade of split logs
enclosing a shelter for storing ammunition and supplies.” Only fifty feet in diameter, the “fort”
could barely hold sixty to seventy men. In order to “protect” the rest of the men, Washington
ordered trenches dug around the perimeter of the fortification. Tenuously situated on the floor of
the valley and overlooked by hills, enemy fire could easily penetrate the fort. This seems a
somewhat careless disregard for the geography of the region, even more baffling considering
Washington had at least some knowledge of geography from his previous experience as a
surveyor.2
Since they did not have the time or capacity to mount a full-scale construction of a
properly protected path for logistical support, the British needed to find some other way to
transverse Canadian territory. While dense forests populate the region, rivers cross the entire area
from the northern lakes, to the reaches of New York. Without mastering these important
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geographical features, the British conquest of Canada would have failed. In The Global Seven
Years War, Daniel Baugh argues that the success of military operations in this theater depended
upon the Royal Navy’s role. Without its pioneering developments in joint operations with the
British army, the amphibious operations that eventually captured Louisbourg and Quebec would
have failed.3
Baugh also explains that, while the brunt of the offensive in Europe lay upon the French,
in North America it lay on Great Britain and the American colonists. Combat forces relied on
colonial troops4 to “bring up provisions and guard supply lines.”5 While the wilderness could
provide for some of the army’s needs,6 it could not supply the guns, mortars, or projectiles
needed to mount a siege upon the French fortifications. Thus, the army needed to utilize the
rivers to reach a distant objective. In fact, the offensive against the French in Canada depended
entirely upon the waters, traveling “up the St. Lawrence River,” as well as “upon the rivers and
lakes of northern New York.”7
Even though these waterways provided valuable ways of attacking the French, the rivers
and lakes also acted as pathways for Indian and French raids upon the vessels and troops that
sailed along these waters. Louis Antoine de Bougainville, an officer in the French army recalled
a French action carried out on the Oswego River under the command of Monsieur Louis Coulon
de Villiers. He attacked a convoy of three to four hundred bateaux, each containing two men.8
The convoy was “returning from Oswego, where they had carried food and munitions, and had
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gone up again after more provisions.”9 De Villiers ambushed them with four hundred men,
forcing the British to flee and “knocked off a great number, and would have knocked off a lot
more were it not for the poor quality of the tomahawks by the King’s Store.”10 According to de
Bougainville, the French suffered the loss of “a colony officer, six Canadians and colony soldiers
and one Indian,” while claiming that the French “took twenty-four scalps and killed or wounded
in their flight about three hundred men.”11
The waterways also provided a valuable route of communication between the besieged
French forces. With the rivers, the French traders and Canadians could easily contact
reinforcements. Dominating the rivers gave an advantage throughout the war. Ultimately
however, the waterways allowed General Jeffery Amherst to proceed into the heart of Canada
relatively bloodlessly,12 albeit with the help of Captain Joshua Loring, post captain in charge of
all naval construction and operations on the ‘Lakes of America.’”13
Owing to the strategic and logistical importance of the waterways in America, Baugh
asserts that the English and the French waged the Anglo-French Seven Years War on water.
While classic naval battles did not occur with regular intensity, the war effort depended on the
control of the waterways. Failure to control this vital resource blocked offensive action. The
comparative efficiency with which water transports allowed amphibious operations proved vital
to the British war effort. Without mastering this challenging aspect of warfare, the British could
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not have won the war. While this seems an over-exaggeration, the difficulties the French
experienced with penetrating northwestern Germany owed to the lack of viable waterways.14 In
warfare, geography relates to logistics, and without the proper coordination of these factors by
Amherst, the British war effort would have failed. Logistics relies on the smooth and the
efficient transportation of materials to a destination, and if the British had continued to ignore the
importance of geography (as they did in the early part of the war), they would have lost North
America and perhaps the first global war.15
Without knowledge of the geography of Canada, there exists an incomplete
understanding of the logistical and military operations in the territory during the French and
Indian War. Examining primary sources from both the British and French provides historical
context. While both accounts hold similar thoughts and observations, they provide perspective
from the eyes of a European soldier in unfamiliar terrain. Shortly following the conclusion of the
French and Indian War, John Knox, an officer in General Jeffery Amherst’s army published A
Historical Journal of the Campaign in North America for the Years 1757, 1758, 1759, and 1760.
Of particular importance is his description of the Canadian territory. In September 1760, he
recorded his journey back to the American colonies after the conclusion of fighting in North
America. According to Knox, observers believed that the British were the undisputed masters of
the province of Nova Scotia.16 Knox claims otherwise. Britain held control of the settlement of
Halifax in Chebucto harbor, a garrison at Annapolis Royal, one at Chiquecto,17 “and three other
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insignificant stockade intrencments.”18 The three stockades guarded the southern peninsula.
Knox asserted that the British troops and the inhabitants of the aforementioned towns, garrisons,
and forts were virtual prisoners of surrounding French forces. While the southern peninsula
remained in British hands, the French controlled the north and northeast, as well as all of the
interior locations. The French essentially held three fourths of Nova Scotia. By holding these
islands, including Cape Breton and St. John, the French held strategic positions to strike at the
British in Canada, as well as the northern colonies.19
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Knox also explained the alarming condition of the provinces west and south of Acadia.
The French had
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“…drawn a line from Cape Canseau, on the east side of the peninsula, opposite to
Cape Breton, across the bay of Fundy to the river Penobscot in the province of
Maine, through [New Hampshire], [New England], and along the frontiers of
Albany, through New York and [Pennsylvania], excluding also the greatest part of
Virginia, by the Allegany mountains, down through the Carolinas and Georgia, as
far south as Cape Escondide, in the gulph of Mexico, claiming all the countries,
lake, and rivers, north and west of this line…”21
Knox stated that they secured this vast amount of territory utilizing “a chain of forts.”22
This “chain of forts” deprived the British “of the greatest part of our most valuable settlements,
and the benefit of the fur-trade with our Indian allies on the lakes Champlain, Erie, and
Ontario.”23 In addition, the French made frequent sorties and excursions from the forts, which
were easily reinforceable. Their movements “struck terror into the unfortunate inhabitants of
those countries, by scalping and otherwise barbarously butchering our people of both sexes, of
all ages; and dragging some, whose lives they chose to spare in a horrible captivity.”24 The sheer
number of raids only exemplified France’s power in North America. British America remained at
its mercy in the year of 1757.25
Knox continued describing that in 1757, John Campbell, the Earl of Loudon, and Admiral
Francis Holburne set to subjugate the islands of Cape Breton and St. John. They hoped to curb
the “unparalleled insolence of these restless, and…faithless invaders.”26 Since the French
controlled the aforementioned islands, they made it difficult for the British to enter Canada.
Knox also argued that the islands were the keys to eastern navigation into the bowels of Canada.
Without Britain controlling this, the French would keep the British from moving into the interior
of the country.27
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In Knox’s short review of the war, he only focused on geography on his trip home after
the British victory in the war. He mentioned the interior of Montreal describing it as a less
rigorous climate than Quebec. Montreal stood on the side of a hill that sloped down towards “the
river with the south country, and many gentlemen’s’ seats28thereon, together with the island of
St. Helen.”29 To him, Montreal seemed very agreeable compared to similarly sized Quebec.
Shortly after the capture of Quebec and Montreal, Knox received permission from Amherst to
return to Europe. On his journey to his port of departure, Knox had more opportunity to examine
his surroundings.30
Like most British, Knox could not determine either the extent of boundaries of Canada or
the source of the St. Lawrence River. While in previous years French historians and geographers
affixed the boundaries of Canada, he believed the territory far smaller than what scholars
claimed. As the French had been the only ones to explore the vast reaches of Canada, British
writers took these assumptions as fact. Thus, Knox limited his account: “I shall confine my
narrative of this country from Lake Ontario, the most natural sources of this majestic river, to its
gulph or entrance at Cape Raye on the island of Newfoundland, and to the lands and settlements
in view of this navigation.”31 Forests dominated the area and existed in a primeval state,
unchanged by the passage of time. Mostly uninhabited and unvisited, the only form of sentient
being that lived in the massive forests were “savage aborigines” and other hunters. While others
may have taken the accounts given by these persons as fact, he argued that the accounts of the
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two groups were normally extravagant and erroneous. Thus, the British could not trust them to
give an accurate account of the size of the Canadian territory.32
Cape Raye formed the entrance to the St. Lawrence River on the northeast and north
cape. There is another entrance into this river the sea to north through the straits of Belle Isle.
Dangers beset the route, possibly owing to the current or ice. Thus, the British seldom sailed this
route, given that French vessels traversed the route when avoiding British warships or other
vessels that traded contraband with the enemy.33
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As he continued his journey, Knox noted that the river contained hundreds, if not
thousands of islands. He stated that “many of them are inhabited and well-cultivated, particularly
the Isles of Coudre and Orleans, below Quebec; those of Ignatius, Teresa, Montreal, and Jesus,
with some of lesser note in that district.”35 Several other islands lay to the southwest of the
aforementioned in the St. Francis Lake. The principal of the islands located in the lake was St.
Peter’s, but Montreal and Orleans were “more considerable.” Montreal was nearly forty miles in
length, and approximately thirteen miles in breadth. Where it was widest, the soil was
exceedingly rich and good. The soil there could produce all kinds of European grain and
vegetables. The best-cultivated ground lay on the south side, where the majority of the
population took residence. The settlements and parishes on the island were numerous, but there
existed no native Indian inhabitants on the island, since they avoided European settlements lest
the colonists hem them in. Of Orleans, Knox said little, calling it “that fertile and beautiful
garden.”36
He next treated navigation of the St. Lawrence River, stating that though the King’s ships
had already sailed the river and could do so without local pilots, the waters continued to be
dangerous and confusing. The channel in the river sometimes ran by the north and other times it
flowed by the southern coast.
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When a vessel tried to tack from one shore to the other, they often found themselves
obstructed by rocks and shoals of sand or mud. The rocks could severely damage the vessel,
while the shoals could slow the vessel’s journey up or down the river. These obstructions move
from one part of the river to another, “by the immense floats of ice that roll up and down with the
currents, at the breaking up of the winters.”38 At this comment, Knox reflected and advised that
since the currents of the river flowed rapidly in many places, the British should sufficiently
prepare any vessel that intended to make the voyage with well-made ground-tackle,39 and the
crew should always keep this ready, whether they are sailing alone or in the company of another
vessel. Owing to the presence of cataracts40 between the settlements of Quebec and Montreal,
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with a strong ripple existing at the Rapids of Richelieu,41 vessels needed to prepare for the
conditions found in these waters.42
While there existed “frequent interruptions in the navigation from Montreal upwards,
particularly between that island and Lake St. Francis,” the sailing between Montreal and I’Isle
Royale was terrifying, but not dangerous.43 Even so, sloops, or barges of similar size could not
move higher up than Montreal, nor could they sail farther down from Lake Ontario to I’Isle
Royale. Sailors could overcome these “intermedial difficulties” with the use of flat-bottomed
boats, canoes, or other small vessels.44
In the river, there existed “a great variety of safe and commodious bays and harbours” in
the river, especially after a vessel passed the islands of Cape Breton and St. John.45 During the
war, the British needed to watch these areas, since the French could run up the river after
escaping from the British and then ambush them from one of these safe havens. Knox observed
that the principal havens were Chaleuer, Gaspee, Tadousac, Chaudiere, and many others.46 The
safe haven of Quebec exceeded all of these. Its massive size allowed a hundred ships of the line
to ride safely through it.47 Militarily, the St. Lawrence River was a valuable passageway. Once a
vessel sailed a short way in from the Gulf of St. Lawrence the fogs endemic to the coast of Nova
Scotia, Cape Breton, and Newfoundland no longer clouded visibility.48 The lifting of the fog
gave the British an advantage on the inland waters. Throughout the war, they experienced
difficulty with the weather, especially fog off the coast of Canada. Indeed owing to the weather,
41
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Admiral Holburne failed to prevent the French fleet from reaching Canada and resupplying its
troops in the early years of the war.49
After Knox explained the details of the St. Lawrence River, he went on to describe the
lower part of Canada. Generally uncultivated, the wilderness presented a vast and unknown
obstacle to the British. The battles fought in Canada demonstrated the variability of frontier
warfare and when the British refused to utilize the resources at hand, or to understand the
difficulties of this form of fighting, they found themselves forced back on the defensive in North
America. The south side of the St. Lawrence River was “covered with dark impenetrable woods,
mostly pine and dwarf spruce, with [stupendous] rocks and [barren] mountains, which form a
most dismal prospect.”50 The territory’s features varied, with the north side of the river stretched
in low, marshy ground for several miles. Strong reeds and “rushy grass” covered the ground with
a forest appearing to the north. After the traveler cleared the frontiers of Nova Scotia, the first
settlement they would find was St. Barnaby, located on the south shore, “about thirty leagues
within the gulph.”51
When Knox arrived at St. Barnaby, he saw “an open, seemingly fertile and civilize
country.”52 At the settlements opposite of Montreal, the land was “rich, open, and well
cultivated, producing corn, flax and vegetables.”53 Horned cattle, sheep, horses, swine, and
poultry fed upon the fertile land. An innumerable amount of tributary rivers, rivulets, and smaller
brooks flowed through the land, sustaining life, before flowing into the St. Lawrence River. The
northland, though, did not have a promising appearance. No “improvements” or settlements

49

Anderson, Crucible of War, 110.
Knox, A Historical Journal, 459.
51
Ibid., 459. In Knox’s account, he refers to the south side of the country and the north side of the country. His
location and description of the geography seems to refer to the St. Lawrence River.
52
Ibid., 459.
53
Ibid., 459.
50

31

existed until the traveler reached King’s farm at Mal Bay. Located near the Saguenny River and
the haven of Tadousax, the Canadian settlers cultivated the land. Here the soil was kind, but to
the east and northeast of these farms, the land remained in a primitive state. The river had lofty
and steep banks, with the lands on the south gradually rising higher. After a traveler cleared the
wood filled island of Anticcsti, they would see that trees and under wood grew on the face of the
declivities on the island. This continued all the way up on both coasts.
Knox stated that the geography between Mai Bay to Cape Tourmentc, was mountainous
and barren. 54 At the settlement of St. Paul’s, the country was clear, fertile, and improved upon
by the settlers, much like the land on the south coast. Many rivers and streams run through the
area and drain into the St. Lawrence River. He believed that the south country’s soil took
preference, but neither coast was universally fertile, with both sides growing some produce better
than the other. The coastal lands from Montreal to St. Francis Lake, had potential, but at the time
of the writing, it had been cultivated. Forests filled the land, growing in cold, spongy soil. The
ground was much better from St. Francis Lake to Ontario. It had the capacity to produce an array
of excellent timber for many uses. There was good grass there, and little under growth. The
numerous islands in the area were well cultivated and rich, inhabited by Canadians under the
government of Quebec.55
With regard to the French, their settlements extended no farther west than the Cedars.56
Knox stated that Native Americans, mostly of the Iroquois Confederacy populated the area
surrounding the settlement. The country was unsettled allowing the Indians to live peacefully,
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without tensions. On both sides of the river, from the island of Coudres to Montreal, a large
number of colonists settled, living in close contact with one another.57
The winter in Canada lasted for about six months and was severely cold. Once winter set
in, however, the average person did not feel it as much after adjusting to the conditions. In fact,
Knox claimed that it was a generally serene atmosphere except when a snowstorm began, which
seldom lasted more than twenty-four hours.58 Regarding the summers, Knox claimed that they
were usually pleasant, except in the months of July and August, which were exceedingly hot and
violent thunderstorms were common. Owing to the fertility of both the ground and the season, a
farmer could expect to reap his harvest within four months of seeding the ground.59
As the aforementioned material referred to an English understanding of the geography
and focused on Knox’s return trip to Europe, the historian needs another viewpoint.
Bougainville’s journal provided an intensely organized record of the events that occurred during
his time in North America. These events include various issues with the geography, weather, and
even provisions. Focusing on these three logistical concerns provide insight into the issues that
confronted officers in the field.
Bougainville arrived at Quebec on 12 May 1756. Beginning from there, he continued his
journal until the final days of the war in North America. He journeyed to Montreal and awaited
the arrival of the French General Louis-Joseph de Montcalm. Once the commander arrived, he
left Montreal with Bougainville on 21 July and arrived at Lachine. Three leagues from Montreal,
Lachine marked the point where a vessel embarked on all journeys to the west. The river from
Montreal to Lachine was not navigable. They left Lachine the next day, and Bougainville
commented on the difficulty of navigating the river, but finding the scenery, “the most beautiful
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in the world.”60 Densely wooded islands and rocks obstructed the river. For forty leagues there
existed waterfalls and ongoing rapids. The river divided into two rivers at a point called the
Cascades, with the northern branch called “La Grande Riviére,”61 while the southern branch
went to Frontenac and to the Illinois country by the route of the lakes. A peninsula “three
hundred leagues long, which extended as far as Detroit,” and “twenty-four leagues wide”62
separated the two rivers. At Cascades, from St. Francis Lake to Isle Perrot, the river was full of
waterfalls and rapids. Owing to the nature of the rapidly moving water, the river never froze at
this point. The lake and the river connected to it extended up to the foot of the Long Sault, a
rapid on the St. Lawrence River that extended for six leagues. According to Bougainville, St.
Francis Lake was seven leagues long and lay at a distance of seven leagues from the Cascades.
He claimed that the trees were admirable and suitable for the building of vessels.63
Bougainville eventually arrived at St. Frederic with Montcalm on 26 October.64As winter
began to approach, the French commanding officer in North America split his force into various
divisions for the season. He assigned Monsieur de Lusignan, commanding officer at Fort St.
Frederic to take command of Fort Carillon by St. Sacrement Lake and its frontier. Shortly after
he arrived there, Montcalm enacted an order he received from Marquis de Vaudreuil on 11
October, to decrease the field ration for the garrison at Fort St. Frederic as soon as he arrived.
This owed to the lack of provisions in the storehouse, the poor harvest for the year, the colony’s
inability to pull together resources, and the unknown factor of help from France.65 Yet,
Montcalm postponed the decrease to the rations for the soldiers, believing that if they did so at
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the end of a campaign, the enemy would come to know and utilize it to their advantage.
Vaudreuil repeated the order, and Montcalm decided that the reduction in rations would occur on
1 November, at the end of the campaigning season.66
On 27 October, Bougainville and Montcalm left St. Frederic and journeyed to St. Jean, a
fort that Bougainville declared “could very easily be burned by a winter raiding party.”67 They
left the following morning following the road from the fort to La Prairie for a short while. A little
river ran throughout the region and inundated the entire area with its waters. Bougainville
complained that unless they (most likely referring to the French) built a place for the river to
drain, then anyone that desired to travel on it could not utilize the road. At this time,
Bougainville also mentioned that the regiment of La Sarre, encamped at La Sahvane, constructed
“about two hundred toises of road commencing at a point which is on the river to the right of
their camp.”68
Bougainville analyzed the geography at this point and realized that the location of the
river provided an excellent point to stop an enemy who may have taken St. Frederic. Once they
took St. Frederic, he argued that the opponents of the French would drive a body of troops across
the land from St. Jean. When they reached the river, the French could then halt the British
advance and prevent them from pushing further into the Canadian interior.69
By 9 November, Bougainville traveled to Quebec on Montcalm’s orders. The snow
covered the ground, and the edges of the river were frozen. The violence and danger of the ice
prevented merchants at Quebec from conducting much business during the winter. Even though
the river allowed the rapid transportation of materials and supplies across the Canadian
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battlegrounds, the change in seasons prevented its usage during the cold winter months.
Normally, the French did not allow vessels to remain at Quebec past October, but owing to the
conflict with the British and the need for supplies, they probably extended the stay of these
vessels. No matter the reason, ships rarely stayed the winter there owing to several cases of
vessels, departing during the month of November, only for the ice to catch them, or dangerous
and rogue winds to dash them ashore.70 The citizens of Quebec normally hauled the smaller
boats on land, to prevent their destruction by ice. A league from Quebec, there was a bay, but no
vessel that anchored there passed the winter in safety. Even if they chose to stay at Quebec, no
port existed there. The ships had no shelter from squalls, with the storms smashing several
vessels against the shore.71
While the storms prevented ships from sailing or resting in the harbors safely through the
winter, other issues plagued the French and by proximity, the British. Bougainville recorded in
his journal that the Marquis de Vaudreuil’s dispatches sped up the departure of the vessels that
remained at Quebec.72 In his letters, the marquis requested that the king of France send more
troops. More important than troops, however, Vaudreuil desired the monarch to send
“foodstuffs.” Even with the influx of troops, without the proper supplies, they would not survive
the war in Canada. At this point, Bougainville stated that this owed to the bad harvest and that in
order to make bread, they needed to mix oats with flour. Vaudreuil claimed that, “unless they
send foodstuffs in abundance, not only [was] it useless to send troop reinforcements, but also he
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[would] send back two of the battalions now [there].”73 He continued asking that his superiors
prepare the vessels to sail by the end of February.74
Winter continued to affect operations in Canada. Bougainville wrote in his diary on 15
November of the Guyenne battalion’s journey to Quebec from Carillion. Leaving the town on the
fifth of the month, they travelled through St. Jean, Chambly, and Trois Rivières. They did not
find bread at these places, though. Forced to continue on, they tried to proceed down the river,
but contrary winds forced them ashore. Forced to remain in deserted regions for several days, a
sudden squall on the twelfth forced them to the St. Anne River.75 There the battalion found their
transportation trapped by the ice. After strenuous labor, they could only free twelve bateaux.
They placed the small amount of food that remained with the troops into those bateaux, which
continued their journey upon the river. The remaining men arrived at Quebec on 14 November.
They came on foot, scrounging for bread and food with great difficulty. The weather forced them
to bivouac at night in the midst of ice and snow. When they appeared at Quebec, Bougainville
claimed that all of them had colds, and their bodies were “wasted and emaciated.”76 Bougainville
claimed that such a march was too laborious, considering that, it came at the end of a campaign
as violent as the French just experienced. To him, they should have started at an earlier date, to
reach winter quarters so far away.77
The winter weather seemed to vary, with some days intense and cold with thirteen inches
of snow. The ice on the rivers and in the harbors prevented vessels from sailing into open waters
and trapped them in their ports. Not only did they continue dealing with the winter’s cold and
snow throughout their quartering, but also issues with the bad harvest affected them.
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Bougainville mentioned that they mixed peas with flour to make bread.78 The authorities at
Quebec established a police regulation stating that the public would receive bread in the
afternoon. Bougainville took time to see the distribution and was shocked. The sight indicated
famine, with the populace fighting to near the wicket, through which the officials distributed the
bread.79 Those who were unable to leave their homes, placed their permits on the end of a stick,
as a measure to ensure they receive bread.80 Winter affected them throughout the French
quartering at Quebec. Bougainville wrote in his journal on 20 December, that snow and
powdered snow fell that day. He described the powdered snow as “extremely fine snow, which,
falling from the sky and combining with that which the wind raises from the roofs and roads,
envelops you, blinds you, and leads astray one who knows the way very well.”81 He urged that
anyone finding themselves in such a storm should realize the threat. The danger was such that,
there were “instances of people who in the night, a hundred paces from their houses, have
perished without being able to reach them.”82
On 29 December, Bougainville wrote that a ship had sailed for Gaspé, where it intended
to leave “foodstuffs” and receive a load of salt cod destined for France. Before this vessel could
pass the heights of Cape Chat, however, the ice caught it, locking it into place. Three sailors
froze while aboard the vessel, and the rest of the vessel’s crew mutinied. Bougainville stated that
the French command considered the vessel lost.83 This harsh winter lasted until the month of
April. Bougainville stated that the thaw of the ice and snow started on 4 April. Two days later, it
was too dangerous to attempt to cross the river, and the massive flow of water changed where a
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military force could cross the river.84 At the beginning of such weather, the campaign season
started once again and continued through the year. Yet, by October, the weather forced
commanders to garrison their troops to try to survive the harsh Canadian winter.
Knox’s and Bougainville’s experiences provide valuable testimony concerning the
geography and weather of Canada. They explained how it affected the movement of troops
across the landscape and how it hindered their resupply. Without the usage of waterways, the
British war effort would have failed. Once they gained access and then control of the waterways,
however, they remained a dominant force on the inland waters to the end of the war. The terrain
and density of forests in Canada prevented the British from moving quickly, and their animus
toward irregular warfare and Native American assistance nearly led to their downfall. While the
small size of the French forces in the beginning of the war enabled them to move deftly through
the forest to ambush their enemies, the British had difficulty reacting even minimally to the
attacks. After the arrival of certain military commanders though, they began to rely upon Indian
allies and the colonial rangers. They understood the terrain and utilized it against the French,
overcoming them in small, but meaningful victories. General Amherst, in particular, utilized
these resources to establish a strong position in North America. With the help of Joshua Loring,
he secured the lakes and waterways that led to the Canadian settlement of Quebec.
Weather remained a factor throughout the war, and the vicious Canadian winters often
overcame even the strongest British soldiers. Considering that the hostile French forces
controlled the Canadian territory, the British had difficulty procuring supplies, except when at
their own fortifications and settlements, which were few and far between. Still, even those places
found themselves overcome by hunger, disease, and most deadly, the weather. Even if they had
protection against the cold, they lay far from established supply trains and with hostile French84

Ibid., 99.

39

allied Native Americans patrolling the land, they could only hope that supplies came through, or
that their own Indian-allies remained true to them.
Without established roads or paths fortified against the geography and weather of
Canada, supplies often could not get through. Even the French had difficulty provisioning their
own forces and ensuring the safety of the citizens of their settlements. Only when the British
learned the value of the waterways did they finally achieve the capability to supply their troops.
Once they gained control of the rivers and lakes of Canada and New York, they obtained an
advantage in the North American theater of the Seven Years War. No matter the force, weather
and geography played an important role in the nature of war. It could stop an army in its march,
ice over rivers, and ruin provisions and supplies. The nature of logistics necessitates an
understanding of the importance of geography and weather. If geography and weather slow or
prevent movement, then the lack of provisions can decimate military forces and cause nations to
fall in battle.
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CHAPTER II: Logistical Factors
For two centuries, the Royal Navy dominated the seas. Its superior training and
technological advanced vessels overpowered any enemy they encountered upon the high seas.
The fleet could not have achieved this superiority without highly developed logistical support. A
subject often overshadowed by the worthy study of battles and wars, logistics provided the
materials, resources, men, and funds necessary for the triumph in conflict and the dominance
Britain held over the vast waters of the oceans. Without sufficient logistical support, armies
starve, fleets rot, and nations fall. In the same way, had the British failed to consider logistical
planning, they would not have been victorious upon the great waters nor in their wars with
France and other European rivals. The French and Indian War presented the British with a
serious logistical obstacle. Owing to the distance between Britain and America, and the
geography of the colonies and Canada, the British forces struggled to fight the French. Numerous
instances show the importance of logistics and their effects upon the outcomes of the war’s
battles and campaigns. In the Americas wilderness covered the majority of the land. With the
threat of attacks by French-allied Native Americans, the British needed to adapt to irregular
warfare. In order to sustain themselves, they needed resources and supplies to cope with the
harsh North American winters.
The British found the campaign on the inland waters to be one of most difficult theaters
of war.1 The geography of the Canadian coastline and the climate made it difficult for vessels to
pass unharmed on the rivers. Depending on their size, they could access the St. Lawrence River
and sail down it or disembark troops to assault the forces and forts of the French. A map of
Canada reveals the difficulties that the British faced when trying to access the rivers.

1

Baugh, The Global Seven Years War, 9.

41

2

In order to access the River St. Lawrence, the Royal Navy needed to enter the Gulf of St.
Lawrence, which the French fortress of Louisbourg on Cape Breton Island protected. Much to
the frustration of numerous captains, the ice-choked waters around Newfoundland blocked the
more northerly routes.3 Louisbourg, a port city harboring French vessels, ensured that French
raiders would hinder any British attempt to sail into the gulf. The persistent threat of the French
ships at Louisbourg hindered the transportation of material and supplies to British troops on
2
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campaign in Canada. The weather also worked against the British owing to their lack of
knowledge regarding the climate of Canada. On the sea, fog constantly prevented vessels from
sailing. One captain commented that since he arrived in North America, there had been six
straight days of fog.4
Dealing with the fog and weather of the northern waters hindered the Royal Navy in its
mission to stop French movement on the ocean. On the 8 June off Louisbourg, Vice Admiral
Edward Boscawen with his squadron patrolled the waters. At the “seventh instant,” Captain
Richard Howe of Dunkirk reported that an Ensign Banker saw the French on the coast, with a
vessel of fifty-gun size, accompanied by soldiers. Early in the morning on the next day,
Boscawen and his fleet saw “four sail of large ships” to the windward, bearing down upon his
squadron. As they watched the French vessels, a fog rolled in that stayed until 10:00 a.m. on 9
June. Because of the fog, they lost sight of their quarry. On the next day, they saw “three sail of
large ships” around 4:00 p.m. Boscawen hoisted the French colors and the sails came towards
them, but the winds kept them from the squadron.5 On the next morning, Boscawen reports that
the supposed French vessels were six or seven miles away. The French vessels signaled
Boscawen, but when he failed to reply, they sailed away in an attempt to flee the squadron.6
Howe came alongside of the sternmost French vessel and when the ship did not shorten
his sail, Boscawen ordered Howe to engage.7 Howe obeyed and opened fire upon the French
ship, but in a few minutes, he brought to the lee.8 When Torbay,9 the British ship, came up and
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fired one gun upon the Alcide, 10 she struck her colors surrendering. The Lis11fired her stern
chaser for two hours, but eventually struck her colors to Fogeux12 and Defiance.13 At that
moment, a fog rolled in and Dauphin Royal14 escaped. The fog continued to plague Boscawen.
That night, Defiance, Fogeux, Litchfield, Alcide, and Lis lost company in the fog. On 18 June,
Defiance, Fogeux, Litchfield, and Alcide rejoined with the squadron, but Lis proceeded to
Halifax, in accordance with Boscawen’s orders in the event of separation.15 As evidenced, the
weather of the northern waters continued to hinder Royal Navy operations. With the descent of
the fog upon the vessels, they could not capture the final French ship, which then alerted the
French to their presence off the coast of Canada. With a renewed watch for the Royal Navy,
operations became more difficult for them on the northern waters. Owing to the unpredictability
of the weather, the British found themselves on the defensive, until they could gain some
semblance of familiarity with Canada.
The failure of the Royal Navy to stem the flow of French supplies caused the loss of
British fortifications during the early stages of the war. The story of the fall of Fort Oswego, a
trading post on Lake Ontario, provides a poignant image of the necessity of logistical
management. General William Shirley found himself frustrated with his inability to initiate
operations. He could not obtain unused cannon from Albany owing to his dispute with the De
Lanceys while other logistical issues including a lack of Indian scouts hampered the start of his
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operation.16 While supervising the transfer of provisions and troops to the fort, he received news
that General Edward Braddock, the commander-in-chief of North American operations, had died
at the battle on the Monongahela River. With the death of Braddock, Shirley received
Braddock’s position and responsibilities. Over the next few weeks, he found the situation dire.17
Admiral Edward Boscawen failed in his patrol of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, unable to
prevent French reinforcements from entering Canada. At the same time, logistical issues plagued
Shirley’s campaign. Fred Anderson attributes a portion of this problem to the lack of available
funds. Following Braddock’s death, the deputy paymaster refused to honor drafts presented by
various military contractors. Even with these issues hindering the progression of his campaign,
Shirley pressed forward until he reached the shores of Lake Ontario. Arriving there, he found
that he could not continue his campaign any longer. Fort Oswego was indefensible, requiring a
massive renovation to convert it into a supply base. This forced him to abandon his Niagara
campaign for the time. He ordered that the fort repaired and fortified, while also quartering his
two regiments of regulars to garrison there for the winter months. He then returned to New York
to await the end of winter.18
Logistical problems plagued the British on the inland waters as well. At Fort Oswego,
Captain Housm Broadley was the commander-in-chief of His Majesty’s vessels on Lake
Ontario.19 He commanded a sloop that carried four four-pounders, one three-pounder and ten
swivels, as well as a crew of forty-five men. On 27 June 1756, he sailed on the lake with a
smaller schooner in company. The escorting vessel had six swivels and could carry fourteen
16
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men. While sixty-six miles south of Oswego the smaller schooner spotted two large sails to the
northwest. As he turned towards them, the sails came towards the sloop and schooner. At the
same instant, two other sails appeared, bearing down upon Broadley and his squadron. As these
vessels approached, the British discerned all of them to be of schooner class. One of the new
vessels hoisted a white a flag and fired two guns, while the other two vessels continued to stand
towards them. These two vessels appeared new, indicating that the French had initiated the
construction of vessels to patrol the lake. One of the vessels had seven guns on a side, while the
other, of similar size, had eights guns mounted on her with additional ports.20
Broadley conversed with a Captain Laferey, as well as their officers, deciding that the
French vessels were superior to their own and that they could not hope to defeat them in battle.
In response, they bore away to the southeast. Understanding that his vessel sailed better than the
schooner, he ordered her to turn towards the east. Obeying his orders, she turned to the east for a
while then stood northwest. At this sudden change in course, the sternmost French vessel gave
chase, while shortly afterwards another vessel stood to the northwest. The largest of the French
ships chased Broadley’s vessel until 8:00 p.m. with the headmost of the French vessels firing
several of her chase guns. The headmost of the vessels was at this time under Captain Laferey’s
stern, where he discharged his broadside. The two chasing vessels then stood to the northeast.
Around noon, Broadley lost sight of them, and arrived in port on the night of the 27 June. As he
arrived in the port, a builder21 came to him and announced that a new sloop would be ready to
launch in four days, while the brig would take eight more days.22
The French control of the lakes limited further British incursions into Canada. The need
for control of the lakes proved another logistical challenge for the British. With the French
20

Ibid.
The Brig had eight ports on each side for guns, while the sloop had six ports on each side.
22
Broadley, “Letter to Rear Admiral Boscawen.”
21

46

vessels on the inland waters, the British could not transport supplies to troops inland. Further the
British found themselves struggling to provide ships capable of navigating the shallower inland
bodies of water. Finally, on 2 July, Colonel James Bradstreet arrived at Oswego with six sixpounders, ten four-pounders, fourteen swivels, and double-headed shot. When he arrived, the
docks had prepared and launched the brig. The dockyard, though, believed that the snow, a form
of sailing rig, would not successfully serve upon the waters. Even if the snow performed as
needed, the dockyard could not provide any guns or sails for her. Scavengers had used the sails
provided for the new vessels for whaleboats.23
Well into July, the port at Oswego continued to have difficulty with receiving supplies.
Colonel Bradstreet reported that as of 7 July, the British had not received the needed supplies,
among which included nails. Without the needed nails, Oswego found its stores and provisions
exposed to the weather. Not only did they find themselves running low on supplies, with their
stores and provisions slowly going bad, but also a French prisoner revealed hidden information.
The prisoner recounted that the French workers were building another vessel of superior
capabilities than any other upon the lake at Luadroque and they planned to launch it soon.24
While logistics primarily concerns supplies, it also deals with the movement of men.
Early in the French and Indian War, commanders in the North American theater found it difficult
to complement vessels with the appropriate number of sailors. While on the lake, Broadley met
with two large vessels, with one hundred men each. He wanted to reinforce each “with a very
23
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strong party.”25 They should have been able to reach their complement at Oswego, but owing to
the lack of competent sailors, they could not. He had made an agreement in New York
concerning the number of men to be aboard his vessels, but in order to reach this complement of
men, he needed thirty more, yet still considered this too few. Besides needing men for other
vessels, he still needed some to man a small schooner.26
Broadley requested permission to build another schooner for operations upon the lake. He
also requested materials for the completed snow such as rigging, sails, guns, ammunition, and
cartridge paper. While the snow may have been seaworthy, without these necessities, she would
be doomed to failure upon the lakes. Broadley recorded that the supplies for the navy had
stopped at the forts along the way for some reason.27 Showing the need for the supplies, he
requested that the commanding officers of the forts forward them as soon as possible. Alerting
his superiors to the situation upon the lake, he also requested permission to build a wharf for the
security of the vessels.28
Even into 15 July, logistical concerns continued to plague Oswego. Its commanders had
difficulties with procuring the naval stores,29 forcing them to forge their own nails. Things
seemed desperate to the residents at Oswego, as they needed supply-laden bateaux to arrive to
resupply them.30 Colonel James F. Mercer sent a letter to Captain Williams at Oneida on 24
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January 1756, requesting provisions. They desperately needed them, since they had already
reduced the troops’ rations to three-quarters of their normal intake.31
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Even though the British had good relations with the Native Americans before the war,
they could not convince the tribes to assist them. Instead, many times the nations sided with the
French. The problems experienced with gaining the cooperation of the Indians persisted into the
next year. These unresolved disputes soon led to the fall of Oswego to the French. On 10 August,
soldiers stationed at Fort Ontario, a defensive outwork of Oswego, spotted the scalped corpse of
a fellow British soldier near the palisade. The raiders had killed the man in broad daylight,
presenting the first evidence in a month of any hostile Indians in the area. In response, Lieutenant
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Colonel Mercer sent one of the post’s small, armed schooners out on the morning of 11 August
to reconnoiter the lakeshore in order to ascertain the whereabouts of the enemy encampment. She
only sailed a mile and a half from the fort, when she observed the three thousand troops led by
the marquis de Montcalm. Later that afternoon, Indian snipers climbed trees near the perimeter
of the outpost and fired into the interior of the outwork.33
On 22 July, Mercer sent a letter to General Shirley alerting him that an attack on the fort
was imminent, as enemy forces moved through the woods from the eastward.34 By the beginning
of August, the French had the fort under siege from all sides, securing its capitulation a few days
later.35 The Earl of Loudon sent a letter to the governors of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia to alert them that they lost all stores and
ammunition at Oswego. With the defensive post of Oswego taken, Loundon encouraged the
states to fortify their frontier defenses. As a final order, he asked them to prohibit the exportation
of provisions to the northern theater for the time. He believed that if they continued to export
supplies, then the French would gain access to them. With a steady stream of provisions, the
French could continue the war indefinitely, while the British would constantly be at a
disadvantage.36 Possibly owing to the deteriorating supply situation, scurvy afflicted the troops
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and the pursers had not paid them since 24 October. This contributed to discontent in the fort and
to loss of morale among the troops.37
It is interesting to note that Montcalm did not want to utilize the Indians to the extent that
he did in the battle. Governor-General Vaudreuil and his brother, Francois-Pierre de Rigaud de
Vaudreuil argued for the extensive usage of Native American in the fight against the British.
They examined history and observed that Canadian troops and Indians had always played a
crucial part of the defense of Canada against the British and colonial encroachment. Their
raiding tactics forced the northern colonies to focus more on the defense of their frontiers than
providing forces for the invasion of Canada. The two also realized that in order to retain the good
graces of the Indians, they needed to allow them to fight according to their own form of warfare.
If they refused them this right, the French would estrange themselves from the Indians.38
The defenders at Fort Ontario heard the sound of Canadian axmen cutting down trees to
open a cannon road. The garrison, though, had yet to complete the fortifications necessary to
withstand the French attack. Even after the 50th and 51st regiments regained their health,39 they
found their attempts to build the defenses of the fort hampered by the rapid change of
commander-in-chiefs.40 Shirley poorly designed Oswego’s defenses, owing to both his naivety
concerning fortifications and to the strange geography of the land. The original trading post was
a stone blockhouse that stood on a low hill “beside the bay where the Oswego River emptied into
Lake Ontario.”41 Across the river no more than a quarter of a mile to the east, a fifty-foot hill
overlooked the lake, “while a quarter mile west of the blockhouse, a second hill stood even
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higher.”42 Oswego was thus located between two points of potential artillery crossfire. Owing to
the weakness of the trading post, even light cannon could bring down the fort. A more prudent
commander would have abandoned the position to find a more defensible one, but Shirley’s
insistence on remaining at the fort and adding new fortifications indicated a shallow
understanding of the tactical disadvantages of the position.43
On 22 July, Mercer sent a letter to General Shirley alerting him that an attack on the fort
was imminent.44 By the beginning of August, the French had the fort under siege from all sides,
securing its capitulation a few days later.45 John Campbell, also known as the Earl of Loudon,
sent a letter to the governors of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina, and Georgia to alert them that they lost all stores and ammunition at Oswego.46
With the defensive post of Oswego taken, Loundon encouraged the states to fortify their frontier
defenses. As a final order, he asked them to prohibit the exportation of provisions to the northern
theater for the time. He believed that if they continued to export supplies, then the French would
gain access to them. With a steady stream of provisions, the French could continue the war
indefinitely, while the British would constantly be at a disadvantage.47 Possibly owing to the
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deteriorating supply situation, scurvy afflicted the troops and the pursers had not paid them since
24 October. This contributed to discontent in the fort and to loss of morale among the troops.48
When Montcalm besieged Oswego, the fort consisted of three separate posts. None of
these forts were “planned correctly or built well.”49 Montcalm soon overwhelmed Lieutenant
Colonel Mercer’s 1,135 soldiers. Montcalm first took Fort Ontario, constructing platforms from
which to fire their cannon at point-blank range at the wooden palisade. Mercer ordered the troops
to abandon the fort on 13 August, not wanting them to endure the artillery barrage. The next
morning, the French had not only the cannon of Fort Ontario on Oswego, but also another dozen
cannon on high ground aimed at the British fortifications. To make it even more hopeless, Fort
Oswego’s own batteries pointed in the opposite direction. Mercer ordered the gunnery crews to
turn their ordinance so that they aimed over the heads of the garrison and then ordered them to
fire. With that, the battle commenced, the French firing their cannon into the fort as well. Cannon
shot beheaded Mercer, leaving command to Lieutenant Colonel John Littlehales. Mercer’s death
affected Littlehales profoundly. Within an hour he called for a ceasefire and dispatched a
representative to Montcalm in order to ask for terms. Montcalm refused to offer Littlehales the
honors of war, believing their defense unworthy of the privilege.50 He only promised them “that
he would protect the British from the attacks of his Indian allies and would guarantee their safe
conduct to Montréal.”51
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As previously stated, British regulars had little idea as how to fight on the North
American continent. While they eventually gained the experience and capacity to fight frontier
campaigns, they found the French soldiers and their Indian allies to be far more competent in the
wilderness of North America. Originally, the Indians proved to be one of the greatest danger to
the British regulars and their provincial auxiliaries. Pat MacKellar, an engineer en second stated
that while building a fort, the engineers encountered trouble in the form of Indian scalping
parties.52 Owing to their extensive knowledge of the North American forests and their own form
of warfare, the Native Americans could sweep in from the forest, take scalps, and raid British
provisions and supplies.53
The British eventually gained some measure of the defense against these ambushes by
relying on ranging companies. Also called rangers, the ranging companies understood the lay of
the land and could prevent surprise attacks upon the British companies, while gathering needed
intelligence.54The ranging companies assisted the regular troops greatly in wilderness warfare.
The Earl of Loudon saw the need for the rangers. In a letter written 22 November 1756, he
requested a fleet sufficient to protect troops in transport to Quebec. Later on in his letter, he
mentioned that he was working with the ranging companies who brought him a prisoner while he
was at Fort Edward. He made the comment that the ranging companies should be able to prevent
the enemy from making incursions into the settled country. Loudon hoped that the rangers could
effectively curtail enemy offensives from the frontier. He also believed that they would prevent
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scalping parties, utilizing their wilderness and skirmishing skills to gain intelligence and
eliminate the threat.55
For logistics to successfully affect a war, transportation of provisions and materials is
required. During the mid-eighteenth century, the fastest way to transport materials was via
shipping upon the waters. Owing to its naval superiority, Great Britain held the dominance in
overseas shipping. David Syrett argues in Shipping and Military Power in the Seven Years War
that had it not been for Britain’s dominance of the sea, then they could not have supported the
troops fighting the war in America.56 The Royal Navy allowed Britain to suppress the power of
the French fleet and escort the vessels that carried provisions and troops to the North American
continent. Yet, naval power is not the only necessity for maritime mobility. Britain “also needed
money, merchant shipping, and administrative skill to be able to conduct effectively a strategy of
maritime mobility.”57
In order to administer effectively shipping, several boards oversaw different aspects of
the issue. The Navy Board oversaw the chartering of merchant ships to transport troops, horses,
and the stores required for overseas military operations. Also known as the Commissioners of the
Navy,58 this body supervised the Royal Dockyards and held responsibility for the building,
maintenance, and fitting out of naval vessels.59 The board often provided transportation for the
Ordnance and Victualing Boards. The Navy Board normally worked with merchant shipping in a
equal exchange. They chartered the merchant vessels to transport naval stores and provisions to
the West Indies, where the merchants could then pick up a cargo to sell in other ports or back
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home. This in many ways was opportunistic. By utilizing merchant ships to transport materials to
North America, this freed up naval storeships and other vessels to be used where needed.
Sometimes merchant captains would come to the government and offer to let the government
charter their vessels for long periods. During the Seven Years War, the government preferred to
convey troops aboard ships under a long-term charter and specially fitted for that purpose. The
Navy Board leased hundreds of merchant ships under lengthy contracts to sail as transports.60
Before they could utilize a vessel for service, the Navy Board needed to inspect and
measure it.61 Once it passed inspection, the commissioners then fitted the ship for service. In the
case it became a transport, the Navy Board instructed dockyard officers to construct cabins in the
hold of the vessel in order to house soldiers. The number of cabins depended on the tonnage of
the vessel “and the length of her intended voyage.”62 For ships intended to transport horses, they
constructed stalls. To construct these vessels, or to modify them in any shape, the workers and
carpenters needed to use wood. During the eighteenth century, the shortage of timbercontinually
grew greater. Most if not all British shipwrights agreed that oak held the foremost place among
all timbers used for shipbuilding. The English oak was rugged and its massive trunk held a
hardened strength. John Evelyn claimed it was “tough, bending well, strong and not too heavy,
nor easily admitting water.”63 He believed that without oak, Britain’s fleet would weaken.
Shipwrights believed the best oak to be from Sussex, and many times contracts specified that the
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builders use “good, sound Sussex oak” in the construction of the vessel.64 Still, with the influx of
building, it soon became apparent that the seemingly bottomless supply of English oak could not
last forever. The new growth could not grow fast enough for demand, especially since an oaktree took about one hundred years to reach full stature. While the Royal Dockyards initially
utilized the king’s forests for the harvesting of oak, soon shipwrights received the majority of the
oak supply from private estates.65
While the supply of English oak diminished, the usage of oak from the American
colonies increased, alleviating some of the demand for English oak. While it never did find favor
with the Navy Board, mercantile shipbuilding and domestic architecture imported it in
significant quantities. The colonies even built some of the British vessels. By the end of the
colonial period, one-third of the British naval registry consisted of American-built ships.66
The Seven Years War saw British vessels sailing all over the world. In order to equip
them for their long journeys, the Admiralty assigned the Victualing Board the duty of ensuring
that all vessels had the necessary provisions and supplies for their voyages. In order to complete
this objective, “the Victualling Board entered into contractual arrangements with merchants for
the necessary supplies.”67 Similar to the Navy Board, the Victualling Board contracted with
merchants when possible “to supply provisions directly to ships of the Royal Navy in those ports
in Britain that were not the site of a major depot of the Victualling BoardIt obtained the help
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from a myriad of different sources including the East India Company. They utilized this
company’s connections to the Indian Ocean to transport provisions and supplies there for the
Royal Navy ships fighting against the French in those waters. Sometimes they hired shipping to
carry supplies to vessels in areas where the Board found it difficult or impractical to send private
contractors. On several occasions, the British army requested the Board to transport supplies and
provisions to forces stationed around the world.68 Without the continuous flow of provisions to
these various outposts and vessels around the world, the British military structure would have
collapsed quickly. Instead, owing to the logistical competence of the men involved with the
Victualling Board, the British military continued to function even in moments of crisis, as the
early years of the war in North America show.
A final component of the shipping process was the Board of Ordnance. A military
department of the British government, the board sought to transport troops, munitions, and other
necessary materials for the waging of war. This board held an important role in the military
structure of Great Britain; as it was “the agency of the British government responsible for
maintaining fortifications: it supplied munitions, arms, and equipage to the military services as
well as administering the Royal Regiment of Artillery and the corps of engineers.”69 The military
relied on the Ordnance Board for the transportation of “munitions, ordnance, and military
equipment as well as engineers and members of the Royal Regiment of Artillery.”70
Like the Navy Board and the Victualling Board, the Board of Ordnance chartered vessels
to transport military equipment to various points of action around the world. They specifically
employed merchants in the River Thames, however. This specific usage of merchant shipping in
the River Thames may have owed to the necessity of transporting military equipment and other
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personal up the rivers of North America. The merchants would have understood the dangers of
river navigation. They hired merchant ships with space charters. This ensured that the board paid
for the cargo placed aboard the vessel. When they did not place the agreed upon amount of cargo
aboard the vessel, they reimbursed the vessel by paying for cargo that would have been loaded
on the ship.71
Since these ships contained the materials necessary for the war to continue, the Ordnance
Board usually ordered vessels to sail to the Nore.72 There they would join a convoy, as well as
alert the master of the vessel where he should deliver his cargo at the end of his voyage. Owing
to the risk to attack by the enemy, it was the policy of the Board of Ordnance to refrain from
sending a vessel loaded with military supplies to sea without a proper convoy.73 While convoys
deterred the chances of enemy attack, sometimes they caused delays that led to merchants asking
for more payment since they would not be able to reach their destination by the time originally
specified in their original contract.74 While this did lead to some conflicts, British shipping
during the Seven Years War helped to ensure eventual British victory.
While shipping played an enormous role in the logistical victory of the British over the
French, an even more important factor gave the British a greater advantage. The maritime power
of Britain allowed it to maintain control over the seas and over commerce throughout the war. As
mentioned, the Navy Board, the Victualling Board, and the Ordnance Board utilized merchant
shipping to transport materials around the globe. While merchants are limited by the number of
open ports, war is also a time of economic prosperity. Following the Seven Years War, the
French monarchy could not meet its financial obligations. It found that it could not pay back the
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war debt that it had incurred. Even during the war, owing to its lack of trustworthiness in paying
off debt, lenders refrained from allowing France to borrow from them. England, on the other
hand, borrowed heavily during the war, spending large amounts of capital. Owing to their
financial reputation, the English did not find it difficult to meet its financial obligations.75
As previously shown, the campaigns in North America during the Seven Years War
depended on a commander’s competency in the art of logistics. Without a thorough
understanding of the complexities in this area of war, the most intricately planned campaigns
utterly failed. Behind the concept of logistics, though, remains a quandary. Without the money
for the purchase of necessary supplies for the army, or timber for the construction of naval
vessels, logistical considerations failed. The main reason for the British success in North
America was the government’s access to the flow of cash.
With her propensity to obtain money, she regained some of her prosperity during the
years before the war with the American colonies. This prosperity allowed her to fight the
colonies, France, and Spain at the same time. With the inflow of cash, she maintained her fleet
leading up the America Revolution, and not until the failures of some of her prominent generals
in America, did she submit to defeat. There remains the question though, as to why she held an
economic superiority over her rival France.
Niall Ferguson’s The Cash Nexus provides some insight into the reasons for Britain’s
economic superiority. In his Fifth Philippic, Cicero proclaimed “The sinews of war [are]
unlimited money.”76 Thus, finance controls the ebb and flow of war. While a state may have a
large treasury and is normally able to pay for the daily necessities of running a nation, war
stretches the limits of that treasury. Ferguson declares “that money at the immediate disposal of
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the state treasury is usually more limited than the costs of war.”77 For centuries, war was the
greatest drain on a state’s capital. It was only in the twentieth century that the institution of
welfare overtook the cost of war as the greatest expenditure of a country’s budget.78
Ferguson also states that the burdens of war heavily influenced the amount of money
spent in order to carry out such war. This included the proportion of the population involved in
the war, the increase in the cost of weapons, and the distance between the various theaters of
war.79 While Britain may have had a larger proportion of her population involved in the war,
France needed to field a larger army in order to counteract its enemies on the continent. Britain
did not need to rely necessarily on an army, since she did not connect to the continent.80 Her
navy could defend her, thus making any invasion of the island difficult. Intricately connected to
the size of a nation’s army was the price of weapons and armaments. As the weapons advanced
over the years, the cost to develop and construct the weapons grew greater. In the eighteenth
century, the manufacture of artillery, including the bored barrel developed by the Swiss engineer
Jean Maritz set new standards. This development remained the norm until the 1850s, when the
breech-loading gun came into prominence. The design of vessels allowed them to have a greater
speed in the cutting of the water, expediting the time needed for them to transverse the ocean.81
This point necessitates discussing the distance between the colonies and their mother
country. Ferguson argues that over the years distance decreased between wars and the home
nation. While geographically the miles did not disappear, the time required for the movement of
troops and supplies did. With the advances in technology such as the constructing of sea vessels,
nations could mobilize their troops faster and thus strike at the enemy sooner than before. This
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“abolition of distance” also dealt with the supply lines that ensured a military force could
continue to function.82 In the case of Great Britain, its supremacy of the blue waters enabled it to
transport troops and supplies faster than their rivals. The French, Spanish, and Dutch, while
capable of moving supplies to their troops via sea craft, also dealt with the need to forge a
powerful army to protect their borders from the invasion of foreign powers.
In order to finance war however, there needs to be an influx of cash. Without this, the
coffers run dry rendering the nation weak. Throughout history, nations and kingdoms have tried
various methods to raise revenue to prepare or pay for war. A nation could possibly rely on the
concept of state-owned assets. The profits of such enterprises were ultimately taxes. Where
limited representation ran a system, the government tended to utilize indirect taxation or taxation
that worked through “customs levied on imports and excise duties on consumption.”83 This did
not suffice during times of crisis considering that many times trade and consumption of products
reduce in size. Such taxes are often “regressive, and over-reliance on it can lead to political
unrest.”84 In order to raise successfully revenue, many countries eventually turned to direct
taxation.
While indirect taxation has its benefits, many times it fails to generate the needed
revenue. The taxation of imports and exports often times simply did not work. If a government
sets the tax on imports too high, it may discourage the import of such products and the lessening
of customer consumption. This happened to wool industry in the fourteenth century leading to its
slow, but inevitable decline. The high duty on such imports also encouraged the smuggling of
such imports. The government could in no way enforce the indirect taxation of raw materials or
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finished products brought in by smugglers. Learned in the ways of evading governmental
detection, they often slipped by customs officials.85
The English instead relied intensely on indirect taxation, especially during the
Hanoverian reign of the state. The French also sought to rely on such taxation, but their
utilization of it failed. Multiple uprisings occurred in the ancien régime of France. Ferguson
stated, “The combined squeeze on peasant incomes of rising tazes and rising rents triggered the
uprising of the Pitauds against the gabelle in Gueyenne in 1548.”86 This example echoed
throughout the history of the ancien régime. While the indirect taxes did cause some unrest in
Britain, it never reached the scale of the widespread revolts that abounded in France. Britain’s
success with indirect taxation owed more to the range of commodities that it taxed than to how
high they set the tax. Refraining from taxing bread and other daily necessities alleviated the
strain, while taxation imposed on such things as legal documents, newspapers, and cards usually
did not create cause for revolt. The sole exception was the Stamp Act of 1765, which brought
about violent protests in the colonies.87
Direct taxation on the other hand has always been an area of soreness with taxpayers.
These taxes however were vital to the waging of war and the successful conclusion of a war for
the nation. Governments utilized these taxes in various ways including a poll tax, land tax, or
most commonly an income tax. While each tax had their positives and negatives, their existence
provided the government with a steady flow of revenue. Direct taxes do not depend on the
market for the successful gathering of capital, but rather on a set status. Even so, direct taxes can
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seem more of a burden upon the populace if incorrectly levied. This high direct taxation
inadvertently led to the end of the ancien régime in France.88
Indirect and direct taxation though, cannot generate the necessary revenue to pay for a
war. When confronted with such issues, a nation needed to find some way to finance its military
operations. This often led to the country incurring a larger public debt. This debt affected Britain
and France differently. While both countries had an enormous debt after the Seven Years War,
Britain managed its debt more efficiently.89 While there still existed a poor portion of the
population, Britain could utilize an inflation tax to help pay for the various debts that it had.
France on the hand did not do so. Its financial institutions saddled under years of heavy debt did
not have the capability to withstand the loss from the Seven Years War.
The study of logistics is a difficult process, taking time and patience. A country cannot
fight a war however, without an understanding of logistics or its proper utilization. Had the
British not provided supplies and provisions to its forces in North America, the French would
have overwhelmed them. Upon the lakes, the British dealt with an unprecedented amount of
difficulties and obstacles to their dominance of the inland waters, as the conflict at Fort Oswego
shows. The French had long held dominance in Canada, where a large portion of their commerce
came from. Their familiarity with the land and their willingness to work with the Indians allowed
them to have an early dominance in the French and Indian War. The British on the other hand
maintained a belief that the Indians were savages especially after the death of their main liaison
with the Native Americans.
While Montcalm may have not wanted to utilize the Native Americans in his assault on
Oswego, they proved integral to his capture of the fort. Used to fighting on the more developed
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terrain of Europe, the British did not understand the battle tactics of the Native Americans,
finding themselves caught off guard several times by the ambush of Indians. Anderson argues
that with wilderness warfare, there could be no victory without the leave, if not assistance of the
Indians. General Braddock failed to understand this and paid for his mistake with his life.
Montcalm on the other, at least gained some knowledge of the importance of the Indians in
wilderness warfare. From 1755 to 1757, the French utilized their relationship with the Indians to
defeat nearly every Anglo-American operation.90Only by utilizing rangers did they gain any
semblance of protection against the Native Americans. The ranging companies protected the
supply lines of the British and helped stave off Indian attacks.
While the French held dominance on the North American continent during the early years
of the war, the command of the seas ultimately brought victory to the British. Their mastery of
the open waters allowed them to bring supplies to their beleaguered troops in Canada. Without
this supply line, the lack of supplies and provisions would have sapped the morale of the British
and left them open for French attack. Their mastery of the sea, however allowed them to ship the
necessary supplies to the colonies, who then utilized the waterways to carry the provisions to the
troops on the frontier and in the northern reaches of Canada. Only by the constant focus on
logistics by the Admiralty allowed the British to survive through this bloody war. Without the
influx of money, the Navy Board would not have been able to contract merchants to carry
supplies to the other side of the ocean. Britain held dominance of the seas only by its continued
supply of commerce throughout the war.
Even though the Seven Years War raged around the globe, the center of the action
remained in the frontiers of the world. North America played a vital role in the outcome of the
war, sapping the resources of France. She had to focus on maintaining a colony that did not have
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the capacity to provide support the war effort, while France also needed to focus on its war on
the European continent and the waters surrounding it. In the end, the Seven Years War depended
on a nation’s capacity to support its forces in the field and France’s inability to do so, ultimately
led to her defeat. While the British failed to grasp this in the beginning stages of this world war,
she later obtained the experience and power needed to project her power across the ocean. With
the acquisition of Canada, she gained an important resource, one she could use after the
depletion of her lumber source. After the American Revolution, the possession of Canada made
it possible for the British to maintain a presence on the North American continent.91
Without a constant supply of logistical support, France lost the war against the British.
France never had the ability to maintain a wartime economy as Britain did. After the war with
Britain, her naval minister, Etienne Francois de Stainville, duc de Choiseul told Spain, that
within a few years, the Spanish and French could rebuild their navies and mount a war of
revenge. Due to the inability to restore their economy, the French and the Spanish found their
war of revenge continually postponed until the American Revolution.92 The European powers
depended on logistics for the continually waging of war on the other side of the Atlantic. With its
resources and the dominance of its navy, the British gained victory over the French. Had these
advantages not existed, France may have won the war in North America and reduced Britain to a
secondary power.
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CHAPTER III-The Agency of Man in Logistics
Ranging companies, provincial troops, the Royal Navy, the British Army, the merchant
marine, and naval boards in Britain coordinated the transportation of supplies and provisions to
British troops stationed in North America during the French and Indian War. Without their
handling of the various logistical factors involved in fighting a war on the other side of the
Atlantic, the British forces would have faltered and dissolved into disaster. The beginning stages
of the war in North America stand as testimony to the necessity of logistics. The failures of
commanders such as Washington and Braddock in part owed to the lack of proper logistical
support. While shipping played an enormous role in the distribution of supplies to troops
throughout the North American continent, human activity and decision-making remained an
important factor throughout the entire process. Without the agency of man, logistical operations
during the French and Indian War would have failed. While the previous chapter investigated
logistics as a whole, the historian must make an examination to provide context concerning the
contributions of shipping agents to provisioning and supplying British troops in the American
theater of the war. This includes investigating the letters of Joshua Loring, a captain in the Royal
Navy who also served as an agent for transports. Major General Amherst also played an
important role in the supplying provisioning of British forces in the North American theater.
Thus, his contribution must also receive recognition.
The Victualling and Ordnance Board provided the materials needed, but without the
agents who worked behind the scenes, the structure of the operations would have fallen apart.
David Syrett’s Shipping and Military Power in the Seven Years’ War examines this particular
aspect. Merchant vessels hired for service or also known as chartered vessels, provided much of
the force needed to perform operations during the conflict. Whether from the shores of the
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British Isles, the coasts of northwestern Europe, or in the waters of the New World, these vessels
performed their duties to the crown.1 In regards to their operations in the disputed, inland waters
of North America, they assisted with the assault and capture of Louisburg and Quebec. In order
to utilize such a large number of vessels, the Commissioners of the Navy required the dedication
of naval officers and the willingness of civilians to serve as agents for transports. The
commissioners placed these agents over a multitude of chartered vessels in order to ensure that
the ships arrived at their destination, as well as fulfill the terms of their contracts with the Navy.
Besides serving as administrators over these vessels, they also sailed upon them to their destined
port and assisted with the loading and unloading of the various troops, horses, and supplies
needed to fight the war in North America.2
The agents also ensured that chartered vessels were ready for service. To ensure the
safety of the cargo and crew, the agents inspected and insured that the ships could sustain the
harsh voyage across the northern portion of the Atlantic. As discussed in the geography chapter,
the weather could change at a moment’s notice. These agents sought to reduce the chance of
such occurrences and procured the necessary supplies for the vessels, whether it was food, extra
sail, or a second mainmast to ensure that the ship reached its destination safely. The agents also
obtained the necessary rations required for the necessary diet of the steeds British officers would
ride into battle. Thanks to the agents for transports, the Navy Board could efficiently “command,
control, and manage shipping, [and] also assisted and facilitated the British conduct of the war.”3
Agents for transports came from both the military and outside world. The Navy Board
appointed both civilians and naval officers choosing only those competent enough to serve as an
agent for transports. Usually only the Navy Board appointed agents, but when flag and general
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officers needed someone to fill the position, they had the power of appointment as well. The
commander-in-chief of the British forces in North America utilized these powers and appointed
numbers of merchants from American ports to serve as agents for transports. Sometimes, if the
merchant captained his own vessel, the commander-in-chief would also appoint them as an agent
for transports, with the power to oversee several other vessels.4
Considering that many agents sailed for months on end, traveled to all parts of the world,
and assisted with the offloading of cargo, soldiers, and horses, the Navy Board paid them
handsomely.5 They needed to understand maritime knowledge, as well as to have a general
understanding of economics. The Navy Board also issued them a standard boat or cutter, usually
twenty-one feet in length, manned by six sailors. The board also gave the agents a set of signal
flags, instructions, a copy of the ship’s charter, and a warrant. With all of these preparations, the
Navy Board expected the agents for transports to efficiently carry out their job, and for vast part
this seemed the case. They expected the agents to alert them of any issues with the vessel,
whether it dealt with the crew of the vessel or a lack of “windsails.”6
The agents made constant inspections of the various vessels under their management to
assess them and to guarantee the “transports were properly fitted, stored, and in all respects ready
to embark soldiers.”7 Many times, this extra precaution ensured the safety and health of the
soldiers that embarked upon the vessel. Agent Lieutenant James Randell reported to the Navy
Board on 27 September 1758, that on his inspection of various ships, he made sure to examine
4

Ibid., 70.
Ibid.
6
Ibid., 70-72. The Navy Board also demanded that the agents alert them to the condition of the shipping under their
administration. The agents also made reports, keeping their superiors knowledgeable about the condition and status
of the shipping during the Seven Years War.
7
Ibid., 73. One of the other duties that agents for transports performed was the overseeing of the embarkation of
troops aboard vessels and their disembarkation. This meant that they ensured the ships were prepared to receive
troops and fitted to provide for their survival on their voyage to their destination, whether that be to Germany or to
North America. This required the agents to not only co-ordinate their activities “with the master of the vessels but
also with officials of the Victualling Board, dockyard officials, and the commanding admiral.”
5

71

the bedding and sheets that the sailors would use. To his disgust, he found them dirty and filled
with vermin. These and other reports concerning the health conditions aboard the vessels, helped
to prevent the disastrous spread of disease among the occupants of the vessel on its long journey
across the sea. When an agent ensured that a vessel was ready for service, they sent a notice to
the Navy Board informing them of the amount of food and water each vessel stored and cited the
number of men each vessel carried, alerting them the vessels were, “all ready for service at a
moment’s warning.”8
In order to facilitate the embarkation of troops, the agent coordinated with army officers
and naval commanders. They needed to select a suitable location for the embarkation and
coordinate the movement of transports, stores, troops, and naval forces. Such a large operation
required communication between all parties involved to avoid mishaps. In addition to overseeing
the embarkation of soldiers, the agents also oversaw the loading of horses for usage in the
various theaters of war. Sometimes in the process of preparing transports, they specifically
selected those vessels that could accommodate horses. Necessity required agents for transports to
order the construction of stalls for the horses. They also needed to monitor the ballast, since the
mass of the horse outweighed several men. Agents also needed to consider the amount of water
and “forage” for the animals to survive the voyage. Once he had obtained the necessary
quantities of forage for the beasts, he had to ensure that the workers properly placed it upon the
vessel.9
Just as the embarkation of men aboard a vessel required joint operations, agents for
transports needed to work with army officers and naval commanders. They needed “to
synchronize the movements of horses and ships as well as to ensure the selection of a proper site
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for the embarkation.”10 The process to embark horses was more difficult requiring the agent to
rent wharfage or to utilize a beach to transport the horses to a vessel. This proved one of the most
difficult tasks of procurement that the agent faced.11
The Navy Board also gave the agents a certain amount of authority over a vessel. Agents
would accompany these groups of vessels to ensure that the contracted captains fulfilled the
terms of their agreement. If the agent held a commission with the Royal Navy, then often they
traveled on an armed vessel. If no armed vessel was available, they utilized one of the other
vessels in the flotilla as their post of command. Concerning the involvement of vessels of a
flotilla with military operations, the Navy Board stipulated that the naval commander of the
operation held jurisdiction over the transports. The agents, though, held power concerning
administrative duties. As long as their decisions did not interfere with those of the naval
commander in control of the operation, the agents had complete jurisdiction over the ship. Syrett
presents a case where an agent for transport appointed someone captain of a vessel after the
previous captain died during the voyage. Since this appointment had no effect on the military
operation, the agent had complete authority.12
In order to ensure that the transports remained safe from French warships or privateers,
they often traveled in convoys with warships. Randell requested the admiral in charge of
Portsmouth for a convoy.13 The admiral then furnished H.M.S. Jason to guard the vessels on
their journey. He also made the commissioners aware that whenever the master of the warship
made a signal to come aboard his vessel, the masters of the merchant vessels needed to board it
to receive their orders. The commander of the escort held responsibility for the transports’
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operational orders, while the agent for the transports oversaw the administrative functions of the
convoy. The agents made sure that the vessels fulfilled the charter given to them and that the
masters over each respective vessel carried out their required duties. Agents kept in constant
contact with the Commissioners of the Naval Board, thus if the captains failed in their duties,
then the agent would alert his superiors to these breaches in contract. They also ensured that the
commissioners and senior naval officers knew the status of the flotilla.14
While the agents for transports played a significant role in the fitting and chartering of
vessels, they also had an equally significant part to play in the Western Hemisphere. In order to
save time and money, the British government chartered vessels in colonial homeports, especially
Boston, New York, and Philadelphia. These ports served as disembarkation points for British
forces in North America and were geographically suited to assist in operations upon the St.
Lawrence against the fortresses of Louisbourg and Quebec. Thus, it seemed natural to use the
vessels that called these ports home to transport both troops and supplies along the coastline of
North America.15
Agents for transports were only one factor in the efficient use of logistics during the North
American theater of the Seven Years War. As stated before, the first attempted assault on
Louisbourg in 1757 by Lord Loudon ended in failure owing to the lack of naval support. Owing
to the disparity in firepower between the French squadron based at Louisbourg and the British
14
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escort, the operation to capture the fortress failed. Loudon had embargoed American shipping,
obtaining over one hundred ships to utilize as transports for the operation. Unfortunately, when
Admiral Holburne arrived with his naval escort and the regiments sent from Ireland, sixteen
ships of the line patrolled the Gulf of St. Lawrence off Louisbourg, with shore batteries assisting
the defense. With his sixteen ships of the line, Holburne could not hope to fight an equal number
of French vessels with a similar armament to his own, supported by covering fire from the
fortress’ cannon. Thus, the operation ended in failure.16
In a second attempt, though, the commander-in-chief of British forces in North America
successfully pushed through the Gulf of St. Lawrence and brought Britain the possession of
Louisbourg. His continued thrust down the St. Lawrence River, only slowed by the winter,
eventually led to the capture of Quebec and the cessation of fighting in the North American
theater of the Seven Years War. This commander-in-chief, General Jeffery Amherst, was the last
of the British commander-in-chiefs in North America.17 His willingness to work with the local
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population, negotiate alliances with the Native Americans, and usage of naval forces, allowed
him to retain his position by conquering Canada.
One man in particular continued to appear in Amherst’s letters. Joshua Loring, a captain
in the Royal Navy, helped heavily with the thrusts down the St. Lawrence River Valley. Born
to Joshua and Hannah Loring of Roxbury (modern day Boston), Massachusetts on 3 August
1716, Loring chose to go to sea as a boy. He served as a privateer during the War of the Austrian
Succession. The French actually captured and imprisoned him briefly at Louisbourg in 1744.
After his release, Governor William Shirley ensured that Loring received a commission of
Lieutenant in the Royal Navy. He served until 1749. After the outbreak of the Seven Years War,
he sailed to England where the navy commissioned him as a commander, gave him “command of
a brigantine, and appointed agent for transports leaving English dockyard ports.”18 A month
later, he traveled to New York with some of the transports he had chartered and began preparing
for Lord Loudon’s operations upon the Great Lakes. This came to naught, when Montcalm
captured Oswego, effectively ending British power upon Lake Ontario. After the French
obtained the fort, Loring performed reconnaissance upon the lake, but seemed to fade into
obscurity until 1759. Under Amherst’s command, Loring assisted with the acquisition and
building of vessels for the assault upon Louisbourg and Quebec. While the time taken to prepare
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the vessels prevented Amherst from pursuing his campaign until after the winter, Loring’s role in
preparing the logistics needed for the campaign was integral to its success.19
On 1 February 1759, Amherst wrote to Loring concerning the dimensions and necessary
numbers of whaleboats that Amherst needed built for the successful execution of his campaign.
Amherst ordered the captain to proceed, to contract various builders that Loring thought capable
of completing the task. The major-general desired fifty whaleboats built, each twenty-eight feet
in the keel, five feet and two inches broad, twenty-five inches deep, and thirty-four feet from
stern to stern. Amherst then allowed Loring to delay in the ordering of the vessels for three
weeks at most, until the major general knew that they needed them for the campaign, in order to
save money for the public whom the navy relied upon for the construction funds.20
While transports from England already sailed from America, Amherst utilized the agents
for transports to charter vessels from Boston. Concerned over the possibility of something
delaying the arrival of the English vessels, Amherst planned to have those chartered from
available American merchants. Without transports for the utilization of amphibious operations,
the major general believed that the expedition would fail.21
Loring continued to appear in Amherst’s letters suggesting that he held an important role
in the campaign. In a letter addressed on 15 March, the commander-in-chief commanded that the
captain increase the previous order for fifty whaleboats to seventy and to make them all ready by
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1 April. Calling upon Loring’s experience as an agent for transports, he instructed the captain to
take up at Boston 3,000 tons of transports by 1 April as well.22
Amherst also requested that Loring contract forty schooners or sloops. He believed that
since they drew little water when sailing, their capabilities in shallow water would prove an asset
to the expedition. Amherst’s letter seemed to assert that the major general trusted Loring, leaving
the choosing of the vessels and their details up to Loring, claiming, “You are the best Judge what
Sorts are the fittest for that purpose and You will provide them accordingly.”23
Loring replied to Amherst on 25 March stating that he could procure twenty more
whaleboats, at the dimensions that Amherst had requested. He had issues with another order of
Amherst’s stating that he could not obtain the sloops and schooners that his commanding officer
desired. The directions for measuring them were different from the previous year and they drew
too little water, with their holds not reaching eight hundred seventy-two feet. Loring also had
have difficulty with the preparation of single-decked vessels that Amherst desired to utilize for
his thrust up the St. Lawrence River. They could not yet receive troops for transportation until he
outfitted them with water casks. While this may seem an insignificant problem, the vessels
needed the casks to ensure that the crew and soldiers did not dehydrate during their voyage. The
unpredictability of Canada’s weather made such small measures necessities in order to ensure
that the troops reached their destination safely.24
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The captain assured Amherst that he would take every measure to ensure that the transfer
ships could take in as much luggage as possible, while still leaving room for the troops and other
extraneous to board. Loring also shared his concern with Amherst that they did not have enough
beds for the men, but pertaining to the liberties granted to him, Loring had already ordered a
number of them, which would be ready in time for the departure of the vessels. Continuing, he
informed Amherst that he had established how much rum and molasses the town contained.
Finally, he told Amherst that he would ready all double-decked by 5 April at the latest.25
In a letter dated 2 April 1759, Loring assured Amherst that he was taking particular care
to follow everything in a Colonel Burton’s instructions. These instructions concerned the request
of materials for building a hospital. The captain intended to procure the necessary materials
immediately to expedite the construction of the medical center, in preparation for any causalities
that the British might incur during the execution of the operation. Logistically speaking, this
showed that Loring or Amherst took into consideration the possibility that they needed medical
supplies for the invasion of Canada. The acquisition of medical supplies is another part of the
process in preparing for an assault against an enemy. 26
Six days later, Loring sent another letter to Amherst alerting him that the 1=1,000-ton
vessels were ready to receive Colonel Webb’s troops. Only some whaleboats had yet to arrive,
but Loring hoped that they would come in time for the commencement of the operation. In
accordance with his position as an agent for transports, Loring also mentioned that he was
drawing up the charter for the usage of the whaleboats, signifying that British did not construct
the aforementioned vessels. His letter continued stating that he was also taking particular care to
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provide a Colonel Jarvis with the necessary vessels that he needed for the transportation of
supplies and provisions to Louisbourg. Referring back to his letter on 2 April, Loring assured
Amherst that the frame and materials for the construction of the hospital would be prepared for
transportation in time for the start of the mission.27
Of the vessels in the harbor, Loring had engaged with thirty-one or thirty-two of them for
the chartering of their services. They would soon be ready for the embarkation of troops and he
hoped that he could procure all of the vessels in the harbor for Colonel Jarvis so that he would
not need to wait to take the provisions up the St. Lawrence River. The agent also asked for
Amherst’s wisdom concerning the purchase of water casks. He had already purchased some,
owing to their immediate need, but he was waiting for the rest of them to arrive from York.
Unless Amherst directed him otherwise, he planned to wait for the additional casks to arrive. In
addition, he desired to know the major general’s orders concerning which of the vessels would
take on the whaleboats. The organization exhibited by the various members of the British
military ensured that the efficient procurement of supplies and provisions could occur. In order
for this to happen though, there needed to be a certain degree of cooperation between the
branches. Loring’s willful submission to the directives of the army’s Amherst represents an
example of such mutual aid.28
By 11 May, the last of the troops had embarked aboard the vessels. Two days later Loring
wrote to Amherst, alerting him to the progress of the operation as well as to request funds. He
desired for his superior to send him a list of credit for a Mr. Wheelwright. Loring had purchased
27
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a great number of items in preparation for the invasion and the terms of the contract stipulated
that Wheelwright receive payment upon the good’s arrival. Loring intended to journey to New
York soon and desired to settle the accounts as soon as possible. If the credit did not arrive
before he left, his subordinates would remain in Boston until payment arrived for the goods.29
He arrived in New York before 2 June 1759. On the 2nd, he wrote a letter to Amherst to
deliver an update concerning his progress in preparing for the operation. As he was writing the
letter, he was working to gather the all the needed stores as quickly as possible. He hoped to have
them completely ready by the following week. Unfortunately, he had experienced an obstacle in
preparing for the invasion. In his search for carpenters for the vessels, he did not find anyone
interested in employment with the Royal Navy. In the Age of Sail, carpenters not only built the
vessels, but they also accompanied the crews on voyages. Their duties consisted of keeping the
ship seaworthy and repairing any damage that the vessel incurred in battle. If they did not
acquire the necessary carpenters for the vessels, then the invasion could very well stall. Loring
had offered a certain wage, as well as provisions, but the carpenters received higher pay working
for private enterprises and very few would serve at the navy’s price.30 The captain had sent a
letter to the Jersey colony in an effort to obtain the services of the same Master Builder who
served at Oswego before its fall in 1756 and expected to have his answer that night. Loring also
informed the major general that he had applied to the lieutenant governor of the New York
colony, but the he had informed the captain that he did not think it possible to procure any
shipwrights. The agent planned to send a courier to Boston to contact a Mr. Wentworth. Loring
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hoped that Wentworth would assist the British with acquiring any shipwrights that he could
locate and a Master Builder. Once he gathered them, he was to send them to Albany.31
At the same time, Loring needed to choose two officers to command the vessels under his
command. He told Amherst that he believed that he could get them and they knew some men
who could sail aboard the vessel as seamen. The agent, however, did not want to sign an
agreement with these potential sailors until he had received his superior’s instructions. The
previous instructions indicated that Loring had the authority to hire the two officers, but had said
nothing concerning seamen. In order to comply with the regulations of the British military force,
he desired to await the orders of the major general.32
Continuing, he alerted Amherst that he could purchase two pairs of six-pounders for a
reasonable price. The cannons appeared to be in good condition, and their owner claimed they
worked well. In the time since Loring began the letter, he had met with the Master Builder that
served at Oswego. Unfortunately, no matter how much he prevailed upon him, the captain could
not convince him to serve with the fleet again. The agent found out that the military had never
paid the Master Builder for his time of service at Oswego.33 The search for the carpenter had not
been fruitful either, since Loring wrote, “I shall do everything in my power, but I am afraid it
will be impossible to get any carpenter.”34
In concluding this letter, Loring alerted Amherst that a Mr. DeLancey and Mr. Walls had
informed him that Colonel Johnson of the New York Troops had experience in the building of
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various vessels. The captain suggested that they place the colonel in charge of directing the
construction of the two snows. According to Johnson himself, he had built many vessels. Finally,
Loring mentioned to the major general that he had picked five people to command two of the
vessels that were going to sea. If they did not follow their orders, then he could not in good faith
make a contract with them. In the event that they did not, then he would need Amherst’s
directions concerning the terms with which he would draw up an agreement with the five
persons.35
The aforementioned letters only highlight a few of the contributions that Loring made to
the war effort. His work was typical of the agents for transports. Without the agents for
transports, the conducting of joint amphibious operations would not have been possible.36 Their
ability to charter vessels for the operations and their capacity to carefully inspect and outfit
vessels for usage during the Seven Years War and particularly the North American theater of the
war proved vital throughout the war. The successful captures of Louisbourg and Quebec in the
last years of action in the French and Indian War depended upon their work. In most if not all
amphibious operations, agents for transports provided logistical support and competency needed
for the triumphant execution of the mission parameters.
Others besides Loring and agents for transports understood the necessity of logistics and
their intricate connection to the successful execution of a mission. Throughout his time as the
commander-in-chief of the British army in North America, Amherst corresponded with several
officers. These letters revealed the difficulties of obtaining the proper logistical support.
Throughout them though, there is a sense that Amherst understood the importance of the navy in
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the North American theater.37 In one letter to Rear Admiral Philip Durell, he understood that
there was difficulty in finding the correct number of men to serve as sailors aboard transports. It
seemed that Durell had had difficulty with obtaining the number of men needed to sail the
various vessels in the fleet under his command. Amherst advised him that, “the only Chance of
pressing any is by Cruizing off this Port [New York], Rhode Island and Boston, and how that
may be feasible You are the best Judge.”38 He continued stating that nothing could “distress the
Enemy more than hindering any Succors getting up the River St. Lawrence.”39 Amherst assured
him that if he still needed men, then he would write to Governor Pownall of Massachusetts to
request that he supply men for the fleet. Amherst knew that some towns of the eastern coast of
Massachusetts would gladly supply sailors to the Fleet, as long as they received promises that the
navy would release them at the end of the war and paid them appropriate wages for their service.
The general continued stating, “I shall most willingly lessen the numbers to be furnished to the
Army, if absolutely wanted in the Fleet to forward that very essential Service.”40
In another letter to Christopher Kilby, Amherst alerted him that he “[had] order’d all the
provisions at Albany that [could] be spared to be forwarded to Fort Edward, Saratoga, Stillwater,
and as near the Fort as possible.”41 At the same time, he directed a portion of the provisions sent
to Schenectady. Also in concern for the well-being of his troops, Amherst ordered Kilby to
prepare “a thousand half Barrels of good pork.” He continued stating that Kilby should arrange a
37
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number of oxen driver up to the beginning point of the operation located on Lake Ontario by the
time that the troops arrived at the spot he designated for the launching of the operation. He
declared to Kilby that he would
depend on your utmost Zeal & care, in having such quantitied of
provisions ready, that, whatever our Motions may be, either from
the successes which I hope will attend His Majestys Arms during
the Campaign, or from the Movement that we may be forced to, we
shall always be in a Situtatoin with regard to provisions to follow
& execute the Operations that will tend to the good of His
Majestys Service and to distress the Enemy.42
In another letter, Amherst wrote to Colonel John Bradstreet alerting him to Loring’s
progress made thus far on the whaleboats. Amherst stated that he intended to use the vessels as
transports for the troops. He continued stating that in his current position, he desired to prepare
his command for anything that may occur, whether it be from the enemy or another unexpected
source. The major general explained to John Bradstreet that he had decided to carry out his
operation on 10 April stating that he wanted to move as soon as possible. As soon as the weather
turned fair, he planned to press forward in their campaign to take Canada. He argued that this
would give Bradstreet enough time to build bateaux at Albany. If any operation should occur
upon Lake Ontario, the bateaux would assist them in the successful completion of the mission.
Soon, he would send up the workmen needed to build them, considering that the expense of
building them in Albany would be less than the one incurred in Boston. Captain Loring would
finish his task in Boston, and then would arrive in Albany to assist Bradstreet. Amherst stated
that he had given Mr. Mortier permission to credit a maximum of 3,000 pounds to Bradstreet for
the purchase of the material for the bateaux, as well as the wages for the builders themselves.43
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Amherst received a letter from Major General James Wolfe, a major contributor to the
conquest of New France, on 6 March 1759. This letter detailed the various difficulties that lay
ahead in the conquest of Quebec. While, an example of proposed military strategy, logistics
continued to play a strong role. Wolfe claimed that they had received strong intelligence that the
French had thirty to forty store ships at Rochefort and Rochelle. Destined to sail up the St.
Lawrence River, the French planned to risk the ice that threatened to destroy the vessels in order
to get supplies up the river as soon as possible.44
Wolfe also reported that “the Government,” had a large fleet of vessels prepared to go up
the St. Lawrence River.45 This expedition would arrive at Quebec since a stroke there would
spell the end of New France. Yet, in the fitting of the expedition those in command of it failed to
provide a sufficient number of men. Wolfe argued that it would have been more prudent for
British command to place Amherst at the head of fifteen or sixteen battalions, while the rest of
his forces created a diversion on the Ticonderoga side of the river. During the diversion, Amherst
would sail up the river with his forces and disembark within five miles of Quebec. From there,
his army would proceed to take the town and place Amherst as the master of Canada. Wolfe
claimed that a “Lord Ligonier…calculated that the Troops for the expedition [amounted] to
12000 men, concluding that the Recruits [would] arrive from Martinco.”46
Owing to Wolfe’s experience in the navigation of the Bay of Fundy in the previous year,
he felt apprehensive that the two militia units would arrive to their posts on the bay later than the
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British officers desired and consequently the two British Battalions would be late to the
rendezvous. Wolfe’s knowledge concerning the geography of the region influenced his fears.
Considering that the ice had yet to melt in that region, the passage across the bay seemed fraught
with danger. Thus, any travels across the icy waters required an agonizingly slow pace, not to
mention the necessity of preparing supplies for the troops to take with them on the quest to take
Quebec.47
Interestingly enough, Wolfe also suggested that Amherst supplement the force with four
to five hundred colonists in order to construct fascines and gabions, while working in the
entrenchments.48 He believed that the utilization of this work force would ease the load on the
regulars as they fought against the French defenders of Quebec. As always, the condition of the
rivers and the use that the enemy could put to the geography of Canada weighed heavily on
Wolfe. He suggested that if owing to accidents on the river, resistance of the enemy, sickness, or
any other cause, they could not take Quebec, Amherst should set the town on fire with shellfire.
Wolfe desired to destroy French control in the North America, leaving only famine and
desolation in his wake.49
He took note that if the French fleet reached the river before the British, then they would
proceed to do one of two things: either post themselves at a narrow passage in the river to inhibit
the progress of the British invasion force, or anchor ashore above Quebec. He believed that they
would choose the latter path, stating that the former would become “a trial of naval skill, and in
the last…they [would] be burnt.”50 If Mr. Durrell arrived earlier than the enemy’s fleet, then he
could assist Amherst’s operations in Canada by sailing sloops and schooners as far up the river
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as Fort de Chambly. Wolfe told Amherst that the vessels would help “facilitate your debaeché
[sic] in to the River St. Lawrence, and favour an attack upon Montreal, or your junction with the
Troops under my orders.”51 By utilizing the naval forces that cruised between Montreal and
Quebec upon the river, the smaller vessels could slip by Quebec in the darkness of the Canadian
night. To these men, the success of their invasion of Canada and the capture of Quebec depended
on their utilization of amphibious operations. Without the naval forces upon the river, they would
find themselves hard pressed to take Quebec or to gain further ground into the depths of
Canada.52
Because of the enemy’s control of the inland waters, Wolfe warned Amherst that they
might strive to exchange blows over Lake Champlain. The French already sailed sloops and
schooners upon the lake. Since the British forces did not yet have vessels built for battle on the
waters, the enemy would remain superior on Champlain. If Bradstreet constructed vessels at
Ticonderoga or Crown Point however, they would be able to counter the enemy. Wolfe also
mused that if Bradstreet placed Amherst’s artillery upon rafts, he could use them to fight off the
French forces upon the lake and protect his own boats, as they sailed upon the lake. With the
French in danger of losing control of the lake, Marquis de Vaudreuil would split his troops,
leaving Crown Point and Ticonderoga to soon fall under Amherst’s control.53 Throughout this
letter, Wolfe demonstrated his understanding that dominance of the lakes depended on the
coordination between naval and army forces for the success of the amphibious operation to take
the lakes. This required proper planning and logistical support. While not directly mentioned, in
order for the British to execute their mission and obtain possession of Quebec, Amherst needed
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to insure that the proper provisions and supplies reached his troops. Without it, then they would
fail to take the town and the war in North America would continue.
Bradstreet also had an understanding of the difficulties concerning logistics that faced
Amherst’s campaign to take control of Canada. When trying to raise enough troops for the
campaign to take Canada, Bradstreet realized that the 3,000 pounds credited to him by Amherst
through a Mr. Mortier, would not cover the expenses to recruit 2,000 men to pilot the bateaux
needed to navigate the St. Lawrence River, not the five hundred drivers. The advance pay for the
men alone would cost Britain 7 to 8,000 pounds. Without more money, he could not contract the
men, nor could he hope to continue paying their wage during their time of service.54
At Amherst’s orders, Bradstreet endeavored to properly examine the men and pay them
in advance, as well as alerting Mortier to the need to establish credit for Boston, New York, and
Pennsylvania. Not only did he need to credit these colonies for the service already provided,
Bradstreet also discovered that the British owed large amounts of money to the colonists since
General Shirley utilized their services in the early years of the French and Indian War. While
Bradstreet dealt with these issues that threatened to stall the British war effort, he did find that
the carpentry work underway was going well in preparing vessels for the amphibious operation
to take Canada.55
By 15 March 1759, the British took Louibourg and controlled it as a stage for the assault
on Quebec. While preparing to take the capital of New France, Amherst wrote to Governor
Thomas Pownall concerning the state of the troops and his plans to utilize amphibious operations
to take the town. For the expedition up the St. Lawrence River against the French forces to occur,
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Amherst needed to take large number of the garrisoned troops at Louisbourg. In order to provide
for the security of the post, he received orders from the king of England to recruit a battalion of
1,000 provincial troops to fill the absence of the garrisoned troops. These provincials would
remain at the garrison as long as needed. At the same time, “the greatest Part of the troops in
Nova Scotia and the Bay of Fundy, [would] likewise be ordered on the same Expedition,
wherefore it will also be absolutely necessary to have a Body of Provincials to join what
[remained] of the King’s Regular Troops,” to protect the weakened defenses of the various posts
from where Amherst drew troops.56 Amherst also alerted Pownall that the British government
ordered 1,500 provincial troops to ensure that the enemy could not overcome the posts.57 This
utilization and movement of troops required that Amherst provide the necessary supplies,
provisions, and transportation for their movement.
In the next paragraph of his letter, Amherst stated, “Transports shall be provided at
Boston or sent there to take the 2500 men to their Destination.”58 He desired to send them early
enough so that the troops from Halifax and Nova Scotia would arrive at Louisbourg and be ready
to sail with the entire fleet around 7 May. The utilization of transports would assist with the
traversing of the waters and shorten the time taken for the passage. It would save the populace’s
money, considering that traveling by sea would be cheaper than marching over the land to
Quebec. It also seemed that the people of New England had a propensity for being “employ’d up
the River St Lawrence.”59
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Amherst sent a letter that same day to Colonel George Williamson. In this letter, Amherst
detailed the orders he received from the king concerning the supplies and provisions necessary
for the survival of the troops in their invasion of Canada. The king commanded Amherst to
ensure that the train and stores utilized for the expedition remained “in most perfect repair and
order for immediate service.”60 Amherst could then employ them on the excursion against
Quebec, while England shipped more supplies for utilization in the campaign. Amherst
continued explaining that the king desired the battering train and stores “with three Companies of
the Royal Regiment of Artillery should be embarked in such manner as to be at Louisbourg by
the 20th of April.”61 Williamson would obey any orders that the Lieutenant General and Board of
Ordnance issued to him regarding the battering train. Considering the necessity of supplies for
the success of the operation, Amherst placed a large amount of trust in Williamson. The colonel
would take command and provide as much service as possible to ensure that the train reached its
destination.62
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In another letter dating the following day, Amherst wrote to Brigadier General John
Stanwix. The Brigadier General received the command of the British forces in Pennsylvania
from Amherst.64 Amherst requested that Stanwix return to Pittsburgh to oversee the city and to
remove all such dangers that might threaten it. Here Amherst hope that his subordinate could
guide the necessary provisions for the army up the river to those forces stationed in Canada.
Apparently, since Amherst’s forces otherwise occupied the enemy to the north, the French troops
would not make an attack on the Pittsburgh. Amherst also believed that a small force from the
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city could journey up the river to Lake Erie. Once they reached the large body of water, the small
force could then act to clear all enemy forces that might be upon the waters. Amherst believed
that only a small number of their French opponents remained at Presqu’ Isle. The commander-inchief hoped that he could utilize the arraigned forces in Pittsburgh to overcome the enemy,
annoying them on their flanks.65
Amherst also sent various letters directly regarding the various provisions needed for the
British troops to make a difference in the war effort. First, he ordered that all transports take
great care in their loading of provisions. At Boston, these necessities would serve to provide
sustenance for 13,000 men for the length of eight months. This figure excluded the amount
placed on board for the troops on their voyage to Louisbourg, Halifax and other places. Amherst
intended the aforementioned number of provisions for the expedition upon the St. Lawrence
River. This expedition eventually led to the capture of Quebec. Amherst next required that the
necessary officials acquire provisions for 30,000 men, including the portion of the army
stationed at Albany. He urged those concerned to forward the provisions as soon as possible so
that the troops could continue to remain alert for the possible incursion of the enemy, however
unlikely at this point in the war.66
Finally, his letter alerted the officers involved in the supplying of provisions that the
troops in the south portion of the North American theater may yet require more provisions. At
the time of the letter’s sending, though, Amherst did not know the amount of provisions needed
or if they even needed any. He had sent Mr. Christopher Kilby to ascertain the necessity of such
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materials. Once he received the desired intelligence, he promised to let the officers concerned
know of the amount of supplies that he required.67
In his letter to Kilby, he referred to the previously mentioned letter. He mentioned as
well, that among the transports used for transporting provisions to the two armies, there was a
vessel suitable for service as a hospital ship. He asked Kilby to ensure that the hospital ship
received the proper provisions needed to provide for the sick aboard the vessel.68 At the end of
his letter, he once again requested Amherst to gain access to and acquire as large amount of fresh
provisions as possible for the usage of the two armies.
At times, politics also played a role in the harnessing of resources to supplement the
British forces in North America. In another letter to Governor Thomas Pownall, Amherst
discussed how the Massachusetts Bay colony’s legislature voted to provide 2,000 pounds less
than the previous year. Considering the colonies waged war against the French at this time, their
hesitation to utilize all of their resources at hand to overcome the enemy astounded the major
general. Amherst claimed that the current campaign would end the war in the North American
theater if every colony provided the aid and assistance he desired. He feared that that this
reluctance to provide necessities for the war effort would set an example for other colonies to
follow. It seemed to Amherst that with their decision to provide fewer troops than the year before
would have repercussions throughout the colony.69
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Ultimately, logistics relies on the ability of a nation to acquire the necessities to provide
for a military force. In order for a nation to gain access to the necessary provisions, they need to
purchase them. Even Amherst, in his brilliance, was not immune to the difficulties of acquiring
funds. In a letter to Lieutenant Governor William Denny, Amherst stated that he wrote to Sr.
John St. Clair to access the standing accounts of every expense incurred from the previous year
during “the expedition against Fort du Quesne.”70 The sheer number of receipts made navigating
the expenditures “so intricate and Complicated a Nature, as to require a very Narrow inspection
to Set them in Such a light as will warrant the payment of them with Justice to the Crown and the
persons concerned therein.”71
Owing to the divisive nature of paying bills, Amherst chose to appoint a committee to
inspect the accounts and settle them.72 This committee consisted of two commissionaires
appointed from the populace, with another two appointed “in behalf of the Crown.”73 Both sides
would meet as often as possible in order to discern the amount owed. Once they had come to an
agreement, they would send the report to Amherst. Once he received the report, he would inspect
it. If he found it agreeable, he would discharge the funds to pay for the expenditures found.74
Amherst’s capacity to utilize logistics to enable his forces to move swiftly and efficiently
across the hostile environment of Canada, earned him the conquest of Canada. Without logistics,
his forces would have floundered and failed to capture New France. Amherst was not alone in
this ability to utilize logistics. As previously demonstrated, the most competent of commanders,
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such as Forbes and Wolfe heeded the importance of logistics and chose to wait until the
necessary parameters for the successful execution of an operation appeared. Normally these
included the arrival of provisions and supplies or the weakening of French forces from the
blockade of ports and harbors. This competence gave Amherst the needed edge in the North
American theater of the Seven Years War.
Britain’s large navy enabled it to dominate the high seas. This and their ability to
transport great numbers of British troops efficiently and quickly to enemy territory allowed the
British military to obtain “crucial maritime strategic mobility during the Seven Years War.”75
Without such operational flexibility, they would have hindered their capacity to execute
successful amphibious operations. While the Royal Navy had mounted amphibious operations in
conflicts prior to the outbreak of the Seven Years War, earlier attempts at assaulting an enemy
stronghold or beach from the sea left the British forces decimated. Such operations required that
all branches of His Majesty’s forces coordinate their efforts to carry successfully out the
objectives of the mission. Considering that French soldiers, Canadian militia, and Native
American warriors patrolled the routes their foe commonly used to invade Canada, British
needed to utilize another corridor of invasion. This required them to obtain control of the
waterways into Canada. They often found their path impeded by the constant change in weather
and the severity and length of the winter months, effectively limiting their campaigns to begin in
mid-spring and end in mid-autumn.76
Braddock’s failed campaign to take Fort Duquesne in the summer of 1755 exemplified
the necessity of utilizing the waterways into Canada to attack strategic French fortresses and
posts. In his attempt to attack and capture a French fort, he failed to employ scouts, in light of the
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lack of resistance he encountered while approaching the fort. His troops vastly outnumbered the
some nine hundred French and Indians, but owing to their knowledge of the topography and their
ability to execute effective for ambushes, the French forces soundly defeated Braddock, killing
him and sending his decimated force back to safety. 77 This humiliating defeat probably caused
one of Braddock’s successors, the Earl of Loudon to formulate a plan in 1756, where British
forces would strike up the St. Lawrence River at Quebec. The British government under Pitt
approved the plan and pledged to send six thousand troops to assist with the operation. Pitt only
made one significant change to the plan, asserting that instead of attacking Quebec first,
Loudon’s forces should first capture the fortress at Louisbourg, thus opening the passage for
supplies to reach the advancing British forces78
These instances, and others, constantly plagued British operations in Canada. With these
early failures, British commanders learned of the complexities of conducting amphibious
operations. They required detailed planning and significant skill, in order to efficiently and
swiftly move troops from a vessel to the shore. In addition, in preparation for enemy attacks,
these troops needed to deploy into battle formation once they stepped onto land. These
operations required planning months in advance, long before the voyage to the stage of execution
began. They needed to embark troops and equipment, arrange them, and then control it while at
sea. If they did not plan profusely, then the possibility existed that the order, discipline, and
organization of the army would dissolve in the midst of sailing. In order to ensure that they
arrived in North America with at least some of the equipment they needed, the planners would
divide the troops, military equipment, and stores among various vessels of the invading force.79
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While the commander-in-chief of the army commanded the forces aboard the ship, the
navy commander-in-chief commanded all the vessels in the amphibious operation: transports,
victuallers, storeships, and other small vessels utilized. Navy commander-in-chiefs normally
divided these vessels into groups and appointed a navy officer to exercise control over them.
While the navy officer commanded the vessels, “the army did not trust the masters of transports
to obey [the orders of the navy officer over them] and directed that, if necessary, an army officer
on each transport should enforce the orders.”80 As long as the operation continued, the
responsibilities of the Royal Navy continued. In the invasion of the shores, the army utilized flatbottomed boats and escorts to arrive upon the shores. While they assembled and began their
journey, the navy commander-in-chief deployed other warships to act as gloating batteries and
sometimes utilized them as distractions, to draw the enemy’s attention from the landing.81
The warships’ focus, however, remained upon the assault and destruction of enemy
defenses that surrounded the landing area. Without this supporting fire, the cannons of the
French would tear through the ranks of the British army. Even after the army landed upon the
shore, the navy continued to support them, through cover fire and the landing of the army’s
supplies and stores. Without the assistance of the navy, the failure of an operation was certain.
Without the support of the navy, General Wolfe of the British army could never have probed the
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shores of the St. Lawrence River and the capture of Quebec would have remained a dream. The
navy even allowed the utilization of seamen to carry out work ashore in support of the army.82
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CONCLUSION
Without the full-scale implementation of logistics during the Seven Years War, Britain
would have lost to the French, in both North America and Europe. Their capacity to utilize
shipping and learn from earlier mistakes in the New World enabled them to overcome their
enemies and establish themselves as a dominant force on the international level. The inability of
the French to full supply and provision their troops in North America, as well as provide the
reinforcements needed led to their defeat in the war. Logistics played an enormous role in this
first instance of global war.
While Britain continued to rise in power, the Spanish and the French dealt with many
difficulties after the war. With both countries deeply in debt, they were unable to raise a
sufficient military force to avenge their defeat after the Seven Years War. The French minister
promised the Spanish repeatedly that they would fight and regain the land that the British took,
but their economic woes kept them from pursuing aggressive courses of action. Without money,
they could not buy uniforms, armaments, or supplies for the troops, nor could they outfit vessels
to go into battle. Such weaknesses ultimately led to their downfall in the Seven Years War. The
French, particularly, could not hope to fight a war on the other side of the ocean, especially with
the Royal Navy mastering of the difficulties of sailing in the northern waters of the Atlantic.
Britain’s dominance of the high seas and their capacity to charter vessels from the Americans
allowed them to provide the necessary supplies and reinforcements to their troops around the
world, and particularly in North America. After their early blunders, the British military gained a
more full understanding of the difficulties of frontier warfare and the necessity of supply lines in
wilderness campaigning.
The study of logistics is difficult and does not consist of the excitement of battle or the
intrigue of court politics. Yet logistics is integral to both. Without the art of logistics, the
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probability of a nation gaining victory in a war drastically falls. While vessels and armies bring
the fight to the enemy, without the proper preparations or supplies, they fall. The politics of
courts govern nations, but ruling a nation requires capital. If a country does not provide for
proper expenditure of such capital, nations fall into debt and collapse as happened to France
during the late seventeen hundreds. Ultimately, mastery of logistics won the Seven Years War
for Britain. A lack of understanding of logistics and improper usage of the resources at hand
typified the earlier years of the war. The latter years of the conflict (especially under Amherst’s
command) showed that these earlier failures provided the necessary lessons needed for the
British to reign victorious over her adversaries at the end of the Seven Years War or as
Americans know it, the French and Indian War.
More so, the scholar may argue that the conclusion of the French and Indian War in
America brought about the doom of Britain’s enemies in the larger scale of the Seven Years
War. While the war officially lasted until 1763, the undoing of French power in North America
laid the groundwork for their ultimate defeat in the Seven Years War. While the French and
Indian War represented only a small part of the global war, the defeat of Britain’s enemy in the
North American theater essentially crippled the French. They had expended many resources on
their forces in New France and utilized a large portion of their vessels in order to transport the
necessary supplies and materials needed to ensure the survival and continued operation of their
forces. This splitting of their resources, however, weakened the fleets that sailed elsewhere in the
world. While the British dealt with the same issue, the massive number of vessels under their
command allowed them to field adequately the number of vessels needed in each corner of the
global where conflict occurred. This enabled them to utilize their vessels to perform amphibious
operations in Europe, the Caribbean, and India.
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The scholar cannot ignore geography’s role in the conflict either. Indeed, the vast span of
the ocean contributed to the demise of the French, yet their connection to the continent of Europe
forced them to field an enormous army at the same time. While the British still needed to raise an
enormous army, they depended on their Hanoverian and Hessian allies for the necessary troops
needed to fight upon the land. Their status as an island nation also meant that the former route of
invasion became a defense against invasion forces. In order for the French and the nations allied
with her to take the British, they needed to cross the channel with enough vessels to transport an
army to capture and occupy Britain. With the size of the Royal Navy, the course of action proved
difficult, if not impossible for the French to accomplish.
Just as the geography of the world prevented the French from easily defeating the British,
the geography of the New World prevented the British from claiming total victory over the
French in the first part of the war. Britain struggled with understanding the difficulties of frontier
warfare and the commanders who led the armies in North America on their early outings met
with disaster. They failed to understand that conflict on the frontier was fundamentally different
from the classical column style that Europeans fought in upon the plains of battle. This
indifference cost the lives of hundreds if not thousands of men. At times, even commanders
learned the folly of their tactics by experiencing death. The French though, along with their
Indian allies understood the complexities of fighting in the wilderness and utilized the forest to
their advantage. Gaining control of the lakes through taking forts such as Oswego allowed them
to seal off British advances into the interior of Canada.
Not until Amherst took command of His Majesty’s forces in North America did the
British counterattack begin. While unwilling to work with colonial troops or ranging companies
initially, his military experience overruled his pride and soon found it imperative that the regular
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troops work congruently with American rangers. He also coordinated joint amphibious
operations that took Louisbourg and pushed up the St. Lawrence River to take Quebec itself.
Utilizing the resources at hand, he transformed the military strategy for North America. In the
process, he relied more upon logistical support to alleviate the passage across the harsh
wilderness of Canada and ensured that his forces could fight upon reaching the field of battle.
The mastery of geography was only the first step towards winning the war. The British
also needed to overcome the Indian raiders. Their raiding tactics wrecked devastation upon the
regulars, as well as the colonists they sought to protect. Early in the struggle the inability of the
British to understand the complexities of wilderness campaigning led to the slaughter of
Braddock’s force. They charged forward with little regard for the capabilities of the allied Indian
and French forces and suffered a bloody defeat. Before the British could hope to withstand such
attacks, they needed to understand them, something that most commanders of His Majesty’s
army failed to do. This weakness was prevalent throughout the officers of the Britain’s forces
and meant they would suffer humiliating defeats in the early part of the war. After they gained an
understanding of such complexities however, they overcame their adversaries. Again, Amherst
provided the greatest example of such understanding. His negotiating with the Native Americans
alleviated some of their raids against the British, allowing them to proceed relatively unmolested
in their assault against New France.
While it is important to examine the specific logistical factors that made the British
victory in the war possible, the nature of logistics requires another aspect in order to work
properly: man. Without the assistance of man, logistics is useless and as such, a scholar cannot
overlook their importance. Amherst’s importance cannot be underestimated. Had it not been for
his ability to capitalize on logistical factors and prepare properly for his expeditions into the
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interior of New France, Britain would have lost the war. While aggressive in his tactics, he
waited for the precise moment to strike out against the enemy. As the war carried on and as
Amherst ordered small surgical strikes against the enemy, slowly enclosing around them, he cut
off the French and Canadian supplies through striking out against trains or ensuring that the
Royal Navy assisted with blockading the coastline. This provided a stranglehold on the ability of
New France to protect herself and ultimately ensured the British victory.1
Agents for transports assisted him however. Ensuring the chartering of vessels and the
movement of supplies and provisions agents allowed the continuation of military operations
across the ocean. They boarded the vessels they chartered, checking that the contracted
transports reached their destination. While often times civilians, they participated in the
amphibious operations that landed troops at Quebec and Louisbourg, as well as other locations.
Appointed as the officials in charge of a group of transports they watched over the welfare of the
crew and vessels. Their power over the vessels was absolute save where matters involved
military affairs. One such agent was Joshua Loring, the Roxbury, Massachusetts colonist who
received a commission as captain in the Royal Navy. He chartered various vessels while in
England to serve as transports. Upon his return to America, he assisted in preparing ships and
boats for the assault upon Canada, but his efforts did not come to fruition until Amherst took
command of the British forces in North America.
Ultimately, the success of the British in North America depended upon logistics. If the
British command had not realized the value of logistical factors in the waging of war and the
necessity of preparation when participating in frontier warfare, they would have lost to the
French in this global conflict. The Seven Years War began in North America. While other areas
1

It is important to note that Amherst had actual military experience compared to the likes of Washington, who only
understood military tactics from what he read and heard from his older brother, Braddock’s experience behind the
desk, or Shirley’s inability to command.
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of the world saw action, the balance point for the war depended on success in North America.
Britain’s victory in the New World taught them valuable lessons, which they employed
throughout the rest of the war. France’s failure in the realm of logistics on the other hand,
guaranteed their defeat in the Seven Years War.
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